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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

DOING THINGS THAT CAN'T BE DONE:  
CREATING AN NEW DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

By

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## *Abstract*

The current DoD organization has served our nation well. It is the most capable military the world has ever known. However, it is based on a Cold War mindset that does not efficiently respond to the rapid changes in today's global environment. There are several defects: the organization bureaucracy has become inefficient; service parochialism has become an Achilles' heel; and the structure is ill equipped to respond to joint, interagency, and coalition partners. To develop a future force structure to (1) support emerging missions that are (2) within fiscal constraints, while striving to (3) improve "jointness" and achieve the objectives outlines in national security guidance, the U.S. needs a major restructuring of the Department of Defense.

This paper provides the background and explores new concepts that lead to a proposed DoD reorganization. It overviews the past, present, and future of the U.S. military to get a better understanding of the size and scope of the issue. Next, it looks at various organization concepts and creative thinking to help brainstorm new possibilities. This leads up to the six steps of a proposed reorganization:

- (1) Step One: Streamline overhead. Eliminate the three service secretary staffs and transfer their functions up to OSD and realign down to the military departments.
- (2) Step Two: Reduce layers. Transition and consolidate service-specific three-star level commands into standing joint task forces.
- (3) Step Three: Change mindset. Establish a joint promotion system.
- (4) Step Four: Reduce duplication. Consolidate the numerous defense and service support agencies performing similar functions into single agencies.
- (5) Step Five: Increase flexibility. Transform the current military departments that contain both "tooth" and "tail" to smaller, more flexible "corps" focused on core competencies (tooth), and establish a joint support force (tail) to augment these warfighting corps.
- (6) Step Six: Adapt concepts. Modify the combatant command concept to better meet the future spectrum of conflict.

The paper concludes with a brief discussion of some of the questions and implementation issues associated with the proposed reorganization.

## *Preface*

On January 20, 2001, George W. Bush was sworn in as the 43rd president of the United States of America. He brought with him the “holy trinity” for the nation’s military: Dick Cheney as Vice President, Colin Powell as Secretary of State, and Don Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. Cheney was Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Powell the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) for “Bush 41,” and together they helped lead the United States and an international coalition to victory over Iraq during the Gulf War. Back in 1975-77, Rumsfeld served for President Ford as the youngest SECDEF ever, and was a successful CEO for several corporations prior to his second time as SECDEF.<sup>1</sup> Each one advocated a strong military, and together they had the knowledge, the experience, and the charm to implement a revolution in military affairs for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In his inaugural address, President Bush promised he would “build our defenses beyond challenge.”<sup>2</sup>

The hope of all in uniform was that the “Bush 43” team would restore the military to its heyday like their “prophet” Ronald Reagan did in the 1980s. Everyone began to spread the gospel according to Bush, including Bush. At the swearing-in ceremony for Rumsfeld, President Bush stated: “we will strengthen the bond of trust between the American people and those who wear our nation’s uniforms. We will give them the tools they need and the respect they deserve.... we will begin creating the military of the future, one that takes full advantage of revolutionary new technologies.”<sup>3</sup> At his first visit to a military base after becoming

Commander-In-Chief, he said, “We will do better...I have great goals for our military, to advance its technology, to rethink its strategy.”<sup>4</sup>

However, not long thereafter, reality settled in and the word went out to the troops not to get their hopes up too high, not to expect any major build-up or budget increase, because it just was not the right time. Instead, SECDEF Rumsfeld’s mission of producing the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), dubbed the “Rumsfeld Review,” seemed to turn into a task to trim the military. Rumsfeld looked at major force structure cuts (like reducing two Army Divisions, one Navy carrier battle group, and one Air Force fighter wing), retiring the Air Force’s B-1 bomber, and starting a new round of Base Realignment and Closure.<sup>5</sup> None of these came to pass. After seven months of exhaustive research and secret meetings, the SECDEF was forced to leave things basically status quo and let the services work some individual changes around the edges.

Rumsfeld had previously suggested that rather than proposing cuts in the Defense Planning Guidance, he would leave it up to the various components of the department to determine whether and which cuts may be necessary to meet DPG goals. On Aug. 23, he offered some more detail on this process. He said the DPG will address components of DoD, requesting them to “come back with proposals that fit these constraints and these priorities with respect to the things we opined on in the guidance. With respect to the other things, come back with your best recommendations.”<sup>6</sup>

The current balance of power in Washington, D.C. makes it extremely difficult to implement significant change. Major change is often politically too hard to accomplish. As Thom Shanker of the New York Times puts it, “During the long summer of debate over how to maintain current military readiness while preparing for future threats, Mr. Rumsfeld wanted to play long ball, but he was playing in a town that measured the speed and spin of every pitch and tallied hits and errors after every inning.”<sup>7</sup> Using the same analogy, Congress has a huge bullpen of relief

pitchers in the form of lobbyists, and a farm team of Corporate America to ensure that, while Congress may lose a game or two along the way, they will always win the World Series of Power Politics.

Secretary Rumsfeld did make a valiant effort at transformation. On September 10, 2001, he laid out a major initiative to restructure the military. He announced an effort to reduce headquarters staff by 15 percent and rid the Pentagon of overlapping bureaucracy that he said was a “serious threat, to the security of the United States of America.”<sup>8</sup>

Ironically, the very next day, on 11 September 2001, terrorists attacked America by hijacking commercial airliners and crashing them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Suddenly, all the bickering and debates vanished, and the nation was united in a new war on terrorism. Everyone’s focus was now on the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and his Al Qaida organization. And while this is justifiably the current priority, we still need to continue to look at the other missions for the military. The same pre-9-11 issues of how to properly structure the services still exist. The old issues did not go away because of 9-11-01—it only added a new dimension.

In October 2001, the *New York Times* reported, “The question facing the Pentagon as it spent months drafting the review before Sept. 11 was whether America could risk cutting forces now to pay for expensive new weapons the Bush administration says would counter threats it sees emerging in decades to come. Today, the question is how best to spend the extra billions of dollars expected from Congress for the new war on terrorism.”<sup>9</sup> While there is some truth to this statement, it is missing the big picture—the long-term implications. There is not an endless pot of money. One estimate shows the cost of combating terrorism at \$1.5 trillion dollars for the next five years.<sup>10</sup> In fact, due to the protracted nature and significant cost of waging the war on



terrorism, the issues of properly structuring the services becomes even more critical. Otherwise, our nation could spend itself into a recession or depression and create a bankrupt military.

So, in a perfect world, where one could make political debates disappear and the armed services and generals agree on policy priorities, how should the Department of Defense reorganize? Being a student at the Air War College, I have the interest, the opportunity, and the academic freedom to try to answer that question.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Rumsfeld was CEO for G.D. Serle & Co. from 1977-1985, General Instrument Corporation from 1990-1993 and Gilead Sciences, Inc. prior to taking position as Bush's SECDEF. A biography of Secretary Rumsfeld is on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/runsfeld.html>.

<sup>2</sup> *President George W. Bush's Inaugural Address*, 20 Jan 01, on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html>.

<sup>3</sup> *Remarks by the President and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Swearing-In Ceremony*, 26 January, 2001, on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20010126-6>.

<sup>4</sup> *Remarks by the President to the Troops of Fort Stewart*, 12 February, 2001, on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/print/20010212.html>.

<sup>5</sup> Esther Schrader, "Pentagon Signals Shift in Mission," *Los Angeles Times*, October 2, 2001.

<sup>6</sup> DFI International Corporate Service, *DOD Update*, August 29, 2001.

<sup>7</sup> Thom Shanker, "For Rumsfeld, A Reputation and a Role are Transformed," *New York Times*, October 13, 2001.

<sup>8</sup> Rowan Scarborough, "Pentagon Staff to be Trimmed by 15 Percent," *Washington Times*, September 11, 2001.

<sup>9</sup> Thom Shanker, "New Blueprint For Military Shifts Priority To U.S. Soil, Revising 2-War Strategy," *New York Times*, October 2, 2001.

<sup>10</sup> Richard Simon, "Defense of the Homeland Comes with Hefty Price Tag," *Los Angeles Times*, October 15, 2001.

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## **Part One**

### **Introduction**

*Someday it will be possible to give selected officers of the several services 'combined arms' commissions that will transcend in prestige and in public regard anything they could hold of comparable rank in one of the individual services.*

--General Dwight D. Eisenhower

For years, and to some decades or centuries, the nation has been in search of the elusive, optimal mix of military efficiency and effectiveness. To many, the answer is to throw more money at the problem: build stealthier airplanes, buy faster computers, manufacture more armored vehicles, and develop new technologies. However, there is never enough money to go around, nor will there be enough for the foreseeable future. At the same time the nation is buying more technology, it is also reducing force structure, downsizing personnel, and eliminating programs. As the Department of Defense and the military services try to decide the best way to reduce their budget, there are many competing priorities. The answer often depends on which question is asked. How do we streamline to become more efficient? How do we modernize our weapon systems to best meet an unpredictable future? How do we develop doctrine to become more joint and interoperable? How do we organize and train our people to satisfy the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy objectives? The optimum answer to each of these individual questions is usually sub-optimal in total, and possibly even counterproductive.

Two of the quickest ways to reduce costs are to reduce manpower or eliminate bases. Congress is reluctant to cut bases, as the loss of local jobs and decreased revenue for area businesses directly impacts their constituents, and thus reduces the local congressman's chances for future election. Much to the disappointment of the Department of Defense, their most recent effort to reduce the number of bases in order to improve efficiency--Rumsfeld believes the United States has 20 to 25 percent more installations than needed--has been stalled until at least 2005.<sup>1</sup>

Cutting military personnel is much easier, as the military is transient and therefore only indirectly tied to a congressional district. However, a direct cut in military personnel has a direct impact on military capability. To compromise, Congress developed a tool called outsourcing and privatization.<sup>2</sup> Congress often directs the services to streamline, which should be a good idea. However, the result has been a significant strain on the military. In today's global environment, we have fewer servicemen, but we are deployed more often. The operations tempo and personnel tempo has significantly increased. Many servicemen have stated they have had enough and are walking away from the military.

There are also those who say we already have enough defense--that there should be a bigger peace dividend—that we should not worry about modernization when we are so far ahead. The United States spends more on defense than the next 20 countries combined.<sup>3</sup> If we are that far ahead, some ask why we should worry at all. The answer is simple: 9-11-01. A year ago, many people thought there was no significant threat to the nation. Today, the nation is fighting a global war on terrorism. As hard as we may try, we can not predict the future. Our nation (nor any nation for that matter) does not have a good track record on predicting the future. Whether positive change (e.g., the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union) or negative

change (e.g., the well-planned terrorist attack on New York City and Washington, D.C.), we will always face an uncertain future—and our nation must be prepared.

The current DoD organization has served our nation well. It is the most capable military the world has ever known. However, it is based on a Cold War mindset that is no longer flexible enough to efficiently respond to the rapid changes in today's global environment. There are several defects that should be addressed. First, the organization bureaucracy has grown so large that it has become inefficient. Second, service parochialism has grown from a positive motivator to an Achilles' heel, creating duplication of effort and misguided priorities. Third, it is ill equipped to respond to the growing need to work with joint, interagency, and coalition partners. To develop a future force structure to (1) support emerging missions that are (2) within fiscal constraints, while striving to (3) improve "jointness" and achieve the objectives outlines in national security guidance, the U.S. needs a major restructuring of the Department of Defense.

This paper will provide the background and explore new concepts that lead to a proposed DoD reorganization. Part two provides an overview of the past, present, and future of the U.S. military to get a better understanding of the size and scope of the issue. Part three looks at various organization concepts and creative thinking to help brainstorm new possibilities. The six steps of a proposed reorganization are outlined in part four. Finally, the paper concludes with a brief discussion of some of the questions and implementation issues associated with the proposed reorganization.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Pear, "Deal to Close Bases Leaves Rumsfeld Disappointed," *New York Times*, December 14, 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-76, *Performance of Commercial Activities*, August 4, 1983. This concept has been called several things over the years, commercial activities, contracting out, cost comparison, competitive sourcing and privatization, outsourcing and privatization, competitive sourcing. They are all attempts to provide a politically correct label to the same basic idea: reduce the military budget by converting military positions to civilian.

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<sup>3</sup> Prior to 9-11-01, the U.S. spent more than the next 15 nations combined. Since 9-11, the U.S. FY03 budget is more than the next 20 nations combined. Source: Defense and the National Interest, *The 20 Power Standard*, online, Internet, October 18, 2001 and March 31, 2002, available from <http://www.d-n-i.net/>.

## **Part Two**

### **A Dickens of a Situation**

To develop a new organization structure for the Department of Defense, we first need to understand the current system. The United States military is an enormous web of people, weapons, infrastructure, and bureaucracy. In addition to the 1.3 million people on active duty, there are hundreds of thousands of DoD civilians and contractors, plus an enormous civilian industrial complex that provides systems, supplies, and studies for the military. The men and women in uniform are led by their service chiefs and unified commanders in chief, who are led by the civilian leadership in the service secretaries, secretary of defense, and President of the United States. In addition to the direct leadership, the military is also controlled by Congress (looking after local and national interests that do not always coincide with the military's top priorities), and influenced by contractors and civilian corporations (with a focus on profits).

Understanding the organization of the Department of Defense is a complex issue (one that in itself would take volumes to explain). For the purpose of this analysis, we will take a cursory look at some of the key issues mentioned in part one (bureaucracy, parochialism, inflexibility) that seem to impede the military from achieving optimal performance. Charles Dickens, in his classic novel, *A Christmas Carol*, used the ghosts of Christmas past, present, and future to give Ebenezer Scrooge greater insight into how he should change his life before it is too late. Similarly, by looking at the past, present, and future of the U.S. military, we can gain greater insight into how to restructure the Department of Defense before it is too late.

## **The Past**

Our current military is based on centuries of history. Even today, our professional military education places a great deal of emphasis on studying the past. We analyze classic military theorists such as Sun Tzu, Jomini, and Clausewitz to gain an appreciation on the art and science of war. However, as good as these theorists were, and while many of their principles of war have stood the test of time, they were all single-service focussed, basing their theories on a single dimension--ground warfare. Today, while our ability to conduct joint operations has increased dramatically and is unparalleled in history, we still hold on to the single-service mentality.

While the army was born in 1775, the War Department was formally established in 1789. At the time both ground and naval forces fell within the War Department, as there were few naval vessels remaining from the Revolutionary War. In 1798, when the navy grew to a size that required some full time support, Congress established a separate Department of the Navy. This precedent of separate military departments with separate service secretaries, each reporting as a cabinet-level position directly to the President as Commander-in-Chief, was the birth of service parochialism. Much of today's inter-service rivalry is rooted in this 1798 action.

In fact, each military department had their own laws and statutes. Even though the laws of the land underwent major revisions (in 1873, Congress enacted the Revised Statutes, a single act that codified all the permanent laws in force, and in 1926, the United States Code replaced the Revised Statutes), the army and navy continued to have separate legislation. While Title 5 dealt with the Executive Department (which included military officers), Title 10 dealt with the Army (and the Air Corps/Army Air Force), Title 32 was the National Guard, and the Navy/Marine Corps had a separate title, Title 34. It was not until 1956 (nine years after the landmark National Security Act of 1947) that legislation for all four services were consolidated into a single piece of



legislation, Title 10.<sup>1</sup> Separate legislation and cabinet level status for service secretaries supported a stovepipe mentality that today is still difficult to change.

In his book *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*, Kenneth Allard analyzes the impact of service cultures on command and control of the United States military. The thesis of his book is that

the American military establishment embodies a tradition of service separatism, one that has been renewed and reinforced by patterns and paradigms of thought that stress the decisive effect of military force on the land, sea, or in the air. Although these traditions, the natural result of historical circumstances and political choice, have on the whole served the nation well, they inevitably complicate the problem of command and control in an age of global missions and technological uncertainty.<sup>2</sup>

Allard provides numerous examples to prove his case. Examples include quotes from Admiral Halsey (USN), who said, “I, for one, am unwilling to have the Chief of the Army Air Forces pass on the question of whether or not the Navy should have funds for building and maintaining a balanced fleet. One might just as well ask a committee composed of a Protestant, a Catholic, and a Jew to save our nations souls by recommending a national church or creed.”<sup>3</sup> Another example is Lt General Doolittle (USAF), who testified that “The Navy had the transport to make the invasion of Japan possible, the Ground Forces the power to make it successful, and the B-29 made it unnecessary.... The carrier has two attributes. One attribute is that it can move about; the other attribute is that it can be sunk.”<sup>4</sup>

A major change occurred after World War II, when the 1947 National Security Act established a single National Military Establishment (changed to the Department of Defense in 1949). However, while this was a major step, the services (the Navy in particular) did not want to give up any autonomy. As a result, the NSA of 1947 was a compromise. According to General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1978-1982, it was “a loose

confederation of large, rigid service bureaucracies—now four rather than three—with a Secretary powerless against them.”<sup>5</sup> General Eisenhower viewed the new defense establishment as “little more than a weak confederation of sovereign military units.”<sup>6</sup> In March 1948, the first SECDEF, James Forrestal, met with service chiefs in Key West, Florida to try to resolve the debate over responsibilities of each service. It too was a compromise. Rather than identifying unique areas of responsibility for each of the services, the Key West agreement results were “ambiguous in service roles, and redundancy in service functions, which build higher costs into the very heart of the US defense establishment.”<sup>7</sup> The services have been debating roles and missions ever since. On one hand, they support the Key West agreement as it maintains vague guidelines that are open to interpretation, and therefore minimize the possibility of placing a service in jeopardy. On the other hand, the redundancy creates duplication of effort and therefore increased cost.

While the Army and Navy have been around since the birth of the nation, unified commands were not formally established until the NSA of 1947. However, the unified commands did not have authority to develop budgets, the services continued their independent resource allocation processes, and hence maintained the power of the purse according to the “golden rule” (he who has the gold, rules). In the 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara implemented the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to standardize defense resource management. However, the unified commands again were not given a direct role in the process, as it was the services who were tasked to develop budgets and submit them to OSD. The unified commands were not in the official loop.

Between 1947 and 1986, oversight of the unified commands transferred back and forth between the military services, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and OSD. In 1948, the Key West Agreements made JCS the executive agent for the unified commands. In 1953, executive agent

(EA) responsibility transferred to the military departments. In 1958, the military departments no longer had EA responsibility. Instead, JCS became responsible for assisting OSD in exercising direction over the CINCs. Finally, in 1986, the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act clarified the chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to the unified commanders.<sup>8</sup>

The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act significantly increased the priority of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the importance of joint operations. The unified commanders finally started to get an official input in force development with the implementation of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process. Therefore, unified commands have only been around for 54 of the 226 years of US military history, and only 15 of the last 54 years with an official method to provide input in joint force development. A quick synopsis of key changes impacting the CINC's role is shown in Figure 1.

**Figure 1: Evolution of Unified Command Role**

1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990
47 - Unified and specified commands established					
48 - JCS as executive agent for CINCs					
49 - NME became DOD, establish CJCS to focus on joint vs service needs					
	53 - Military departments (vs JCS) as executive agents for CINCs				
	58 - Joint Staff assists SECDEF directing CINCs				
				86 - GNA, CJCS, JROC, COCOM	
				87 - SOCOM	
					96 - JWCA, Joint Vision
					97 - QDR
					99 - JFCOM

Our nation continues to struggle with limited resources, budget battles, and disagreements on command and control. Carl Builder, a prominent analyst from Rand, has described the service parochialism in terms of altars of worship: “For the Navy, this altar is independent command at sea, for the Air Force, the inexhaustible fountain of aerospace technology, and for the Army, its


status as the nation's obedient servant.”<sup>9</sup> Interservice rivalries continue to thrive.<sup>10</sup> The military also continues to have problems with interoperability and communication between service-unique command and control systems, as was evident when an Air Force F-15 shot down an Army Blackhawk helicopter in Northern Iraq in 1994. The U.S. military can do better.

## The Present

By looking at the past, it is understandable how we arrived at the current structure. And while this may be the most effective military on earth, it does not mean it is organized in the most effective or efficient way. The military has been successful, even in the limited wars we have faced in the past fifteen years (Panama, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the current war in Afghanistan).

The current force structure is inefficient. There are multiple layers and redundancies. The basic organization of DoD is shown in Figure 2.


**Figure 2: Organization of the Department of Defense**



On the surface, from this macro-view, it looks like a nice, straightforward, hierarchical system, with unity of command. However, the true command and administrative relationships

are much more complex. By peeling the onion and looking at the additional layers in the DoD structure, we see a much more complicated organization (Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Organization of the Department of Defense ... A Closer Look**



However, even this picture does not tell the full story. Drawing a diagram of the entire DoD organization would take several volumes. However, one can begin to see how the overlap, redundancy, and interconnectivity begins to weave a web of confusion and inefficiency.

Some of the redundancy is due to the overlap in basic roles and missions. Some Secretary of Defense functions duplicate service secretary functions. OSD also duplicates functions within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some service secretary functions duplicate each other as well as their military department headquarters. Finally, some military department functions duplicate each other. This paper has an Appendix with a comparison of the roles and missions as defined in DoD Directive 5100.1. By reviewing this comparison, the duplication of effort is quite evident.

In addition to the overlap of functions, the quest for information has created an abundance of support organizations. For example, in addition to over 2000 military and civilians within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, there are 20 defense agencies and DoD field activities with over 96,000 authorizations (Figure 4).

In addition to these 20 OSD-level agencies, each Service also has numerous subordinate activities and agencies. At just the first level of the DoD structure, the Joint Staff has 13 committees, boards, planning groups, and advisors reporting to it.<sup>11</sup> The Air Force has eight major commands, 33 field operating agencies, and four direct reporting units.<sup>12</sup> The Army had 15 major commands and six support agencies. The navy has eight operating forces commands and 18 shore establishment commands.<sup>13</sup>


**Figure 4: OSD Staff, Defense Agencies and Field Activities**

Source: OSD/DA&M

Office of the Secretary of Defense	Auths	Defense Agencies	Auths
Front Office	56	Defense Security Cooperation Agency	371
USD Policy	411	Defense Contract Audit Agency	3999
USD Comptroller	323	Defense Logistics Agency	25097
USD Personnel & Readiness	220	Defense Information Systems Agency	25490
USD Acquisition, Technology & Logistics	481	Defense Intelligence Agency	inc
ASD C3I	282	National Security Agency/Central Security Service	inc
ASD Legislative Affairs	30	National Imagery and Mapping Agency	inc
ASD Public Affairs	76	Defense Threat Reduction Agency	2056
Director Net Assessment	14	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	177
Director Operational Test & Evaluation	48	Defense Legal Services Agency	113
Director Administration and Management	36	Ballistic Missile Defense Agency	533
Inspector General		Defense Finance and Accounting Service	18630
ATSD Intelligence Oversight	9	Defense Security Service	2675
General Council	59	<b>Total</b>	<b>79141</b>
ATSD Civil Support			
<b>Total</b>	<b>2045</b>	<b>Field Activities</b>	<b>Auths</b>
		Washington Headquarters Services	1655
		Office of Economic Adjustment	36
		Department of Defense Education Activity	13485
		Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Persons Office	115
		Department of Defense Human Resources Activity	691
		TRICARE Management Activity	361
		American Forces Information Services	641
		<b>Total</b>	<b>16984</b>
<b>TOTAL OSD LEVEL PERSONNEL: 98170</b>			

All of this layering reinforces service parochialism. In addition, it is imbedded in the political nature of today's military acquisition. In Chester Richard's analysis, *A Swift Elusive Sword: What if Sun Tzu and John Boyd did a National Defense Review?*, he views this as: "Even when the using service and the secretary of defense have expressed a need for the weapon, it represents votes for the employees who work the program, and from other constituents who believe that these programs are good for the district or who simply see defense contracts as elements of civil pride. Absent of such a need, defense programs are jobs programs without the 'welfare' label."<sup>14</sup>

As a result, the services maintain their empires, the contractors maintain their profits, and Congressmen maintain their votes. Today there are multiple walls of parochialism that need renovation (Figure 5).



**Figure 5: Walls of Parochialism**

## **The Future**

While no one can know exactly what the future hold, we can identify what we think the future will look like. For the United States, key documents outlining future security issues include the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020), and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

***National Security Strategy.*** The United States publishes a National Security Strategy (NSS) outlining the overarching objectives, strategies and goals for future progress. The current NSS identifies three core objectives: (1) to enhance America's security; (2) to bolster America's economic prosperity; and (3) to promote democracy and human rights abroad. According to the



NSS, the threats to U.S. interests have the potential to grow more deadly. These threats and challenges include:

- regional or state-centered threats (through coercion or aggression, they threaten the sovereignty of their neighbors, economic stability, and international access to resources),
- transnational threats (without regard to national borders, and often arising from non-state actors, threats include terrorism, drug trafficking and other international crime, illicit arms trafficking, uncontrolled refugee migration, trafficking in human beings, and cyber-attacks),
- spread of dangerous technologies (weapons of mass destruction), failed states (potentially generating internal conflict, mass migration, famine, epidemic diseases, environmental disasters, mass killings and aggression),
- other states (that fail to respect the rights of their own citizens and tolerate or actively engage in human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing or acts of genocide not only harm their own people, but can spark civil wars and refugee crises),
- foreign intelligence collection (targeting American military, diplomatic, technological, economic and commercial secrets),
- and environmental and health threats.<sup>15</sup>

The NSS identifies numerous tasks for the U.S. military. The laundry list of military activities in the NSS includes: overseas presence; peacetime engagement; defense cooperation; security assistance, training and exercises with allies and friends; deter aggression and coercion; build coalitions; promote regional stability; serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies; maintain credible combat forces forward deployed; effective global power projection; strategic mobility; deployment and sustainment of U.S. and multinational forces; maintaining and ensuring access to sufficient fleets of aircraft, ships, vehicles and trains, as well as bases, ports, pre-positioned equipment and other infrastructure; ensure the continued viability of the infrastructure that supports U.S. nuclear forces and weapons; preserve internationally recognized freedom of navigation; maintaining U.S. leadership and technological superiority in space; prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction; maintaining information superiority; and if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our vital interests are threatened.<sup>16</sup>

The NSS also highlights the need to prepare for an uncertain future. The guidance from the NSS provides support for the possibility of a radical change to the military organization:

We must prepare for an uncertain future even as we address today's security problems. We need to look closely at our national security apparatus to ensure its effectiveness by adapting its institutions to meet new challenges. This means we must transform our capabilities and organizations - diplomatic, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and economic - to act swiftly and to anticipate new opportunities and threats in today's continually evolving, highly complex international security environment.<sup>17</sup>

***National Military Strategy.*** The National Military Strategy outlines the chairman's guidance on the strategic direction of the military. The theme is Shape, Respond, Prepare Now—A Military Strategy for a New Era. The three pillars are to shape the international environment, respond to the full spectrum of crisis, and prepare now for an uncertain future. The document includes guidance such as:

- the United States requires forces of sufficient size, depth, flexibility, and combat power to defend the US homeland; maintain effective overseas presence; conduct a wide range of concurrent engagement activities and smaller-scale contingencies, including peace operations; and conduct decisive campaigns against adversaries in two distant, overlapping major theater wars, all in the face of WMD and other asymmetric threats
- US Armed Forces as a whole must be multi-mission capable; interoperable among all elements of US Services and selected foreign militaries; and able to coordinate operations with other agencies of government, and some civil institutions
- A fully joint force requires joint operational concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures—as well as institutional, organizational, intellectual, and system interoperability.<sup>18</sup>

The U.S. view of the future mirrors those of our allies. For example, Great Britain's national military strategy has similar themes. When talking the military dimension of their strategic context, Britain highlights coalitions, host nation support, the changing nature of warfare,

asymmetry, WMD proliferation, proliferation of conventional weapons, arms control, and the physical and moral character of military personnel.<sup>19</sup>

***Joint Vision 2020.*** The Joint Staff has taken this guidance and developed a vision of the future, called Joint Vision 2020, or JV 2020. It is designed as a guide to transform the military for the future. The vision of JV 2020 is a joint force capable of “full spectrum dominance” that is “persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.”<sup>20</sup> To achieve this, the Joint Staff says we need dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focussed logistics, and full dimensional protection. The enablers for this are information superiority and innovation. Guidance is “to build the most effective force for 2020, we must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.”<sup>21</sup>

JV 2020 also defines five domains of operation: the three traditional domains of air, land and sea, plus space and information.<sup>22</sup> JV 2020 also includes several key objectives for a future force structure. First, it expands the concept of innovation to include organizational and conceptual innovation in addition to technological innovation.<sup>23</sup> Second, JV 2020 says, “Interoperability is the foundation of effective joint, multinational, and interagency operations.”<sup>24</sup> Third, JV 2020 provides clear guidance on how to address command and control:

In the joint force of the future, command and control will remain the primary integrating and coordinating function for operational capabilities and Service components. As the nature of military operations evolves, there is a need to evaluate continually the nature of command and control organizations, mechanisms, systems, and tools. There are two major issues to address in this evaluation—command structures and processes, and the information systems and technologies that are best suited to support them.<sup>25</sup>

***Quadrennial Defense Review.*** It is significant to note that the three previous documents (NSS, NMS, JV 2020) were all written under the previous administration. Since President Bush was inaugurated in January 2001, the only formal strategy document has been the September

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. As alluded to in the preface, while the military initially hoped for major increases in defense, and mid-term predictions included significant cuts, when the QDR was finally published, there was not much change. The QDR determined that the current force structure (Figure 6) provides moderate operational risk when assessed across the spectrum of conflict. As the Washington Times reported,

And, in a victory for the generals and admirals who fought a bureaucratic battle to save their troops and ships from budget cuts, the new QDR keeps the armed forces at their current sizes. ‘So in the end, what we did is we kept moving the pieces around the board, asking ourselves, Do we like this picture?’ a senior Defense Department official told reporters at the Pentagon. ‘And in the end, it came out with the force pretty much where it is now.’<sup>26</sup>

Army	
Divisions (Active/National Guard)	10/8
Active Armored Cavalry/Light Cavalry Regiments	1/1
Enhanced Separate Brigades (National Guard)	15
Navy	
Aircraft Carriers	12
Air Wings (Active/Reserve)	10/1
Amphibious Ready Groups	12
Attack Submarines	55
Surface Combatants (Active/Reserve)	108/8
Air Force	
Active Fighter Squadrons	46
Reserve Fighter Squadrons	38
Reserve Air Defense Squadrons	4
Bombers (Combat-Coded)	112
Marine Corps (3 Marine Expeditionary Forces)	
Divisions (Active/Reserve)	3/1
Air Wings (Active/Reserve)	3/1
Force Service Support Groups (Active/Reserve)	3/1

**Figure 6: Current Force Structure**

Source: Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, September 2001

Even though the QDR did not significantly modify DoD force structure, it did highlight homeland defense as the top priority. In addition, it reinforced many of the transformation and joint themes from the NSS, NMS, and JV 2020. The QDR identified four transformation pillars: strengthen joint operations, experimenting with new approaches, exploiting US intelligence advantages, and developing transformational capabilities.

The QDR addresses the need for a paradigm shift in force planning to “provide over time a richer set of military options across the operational spectrum than is available today and to ensure that U.S. forces have the means to adapt in time to surprise.”<sup>27</sup> The need for smaller units with a flexible force structure is evident in the force-sizing construct build forces designed to:

- Defend the United States;
- Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions;
- Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts – including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and
- Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations.

The QDR also addresses the need to revitalize the DoD establishment, stating that DoD has not kept up with the changing business environment. There is excess infrastructure, decades old financial systems, and regulations that discourage risk-taking. The report outlines how DoD will initiate efforts in four areas:

- Streamline the overhead structure and flatten the organization;
- Focus DoD “owned” resources on being excellent in those areas that contribute directly to warfighting;
- Modernize the DoD-wide approach to business information; and
- Consolidate and modernize base infrastructure.

From the looks of the guidance in the QDR, the time may be ripe for new concepts. The easy part is coming up with ideas. The hard part is convincing all the players, each with their own special interests, to implement the ideas for the greater good of the nation.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> The legislative history that accompanies Public Law 1028, Title 10 and Title 32 United States Code, August 10, 1956, provides a brief history of the major changes to the structure of legislation.

<sup>2</sup> Kenneth Allard, *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*, (Washington, D.C.: Yale University Press, 1996), 7.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 118.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 119.

<sup>5</sup> David C. Jones, "Past Organizational Problems," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 1996), 25.

<sup>6</sup> General Dwight D. Eisenhower, quoted in David Jablonsky, "Eisenhower and the Origins of Unified Command," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1999-2000), 26.

<sup>7</sup> Barry M. Blechman, et. al., *Key West Revisited: Roles and Missions of the US Armed Forces in the Twenty-First Century* (Washington, D.C.: The Henry Stimson Center, 1993).

<sup>8</sup> JFSC Publication 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000* (Norfolk, Virginia: National Defense University/US Government Printing Office, 2000), 1-21.

<sup>9</sup> Allard, 12.

<sup>10</sup> For example, an Army officer at Air War College had a seminar discussion that several years ago, all the services had agreed to join together in identifying the future force structure. He said the Air Force Chief of Staff "sold out" the other services by recommending a reduction in the Army to provide additional dollars for the JSF and F-22. His rationale did not discuss whether the current environment supported a smaller Army, or rather the nation needs the JSF or F-22, but rather the simple rationale that the Air Force "sold out" to the other service. The debate was emotional rather than logical.

<sup>11</sup> Joint Forces Staff College Publication 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000* (Norfolk Virginia: National Defense University, 2000), 1-27.

<sup>12</sup> "USAF Almanac 2001," *Air Force Magazine*, 1.

<sup>13</sup> *Navy Organization*, on-line, August 20, 2001, Internet, available from <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/organization>.

<sup>14</sup> Chester W. Richards, *A Swift, Elusive Sword: What if Sun Tzu and John Boyd did a National Defense Review?*, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 2001), 9.

<sup>15</sup> The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1999).

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 17-18.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>18</sup> National Military Strategy.

<sup>19</sup> Ministry of Defense, *The Future Strategic Context for Defense*, (London: Director General Corporate Communications, 1991), 17-20.

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<sup>20</sup> *Joint Vision 2020* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, June 2000), 1.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

<sup>26</sup> Rowan Scarborough, "Pentagon to Focus on Defense of U.S. Soil," *Washington Times*, October 2, 2001.

<sup>27</sup> *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, September 2001.

## Part Three

### Brainstorming and Benchmarking

*The world we created today has problems which cannot be solved by thinking the way we thought when we created them.*

--Albert Einstein

To set the stage for a major restructuring of the Department of Defense, there needs to be a willingness to part from the comfort of status quo and be open to a fresh set of ideas. As Albert Einstein's quote above indicates, we must try to think out of the box. What worked for us in the past may not spell success in the future. As mentioned earlier, one of the guidelines in JV 2020 is organizational and conceptual innovation. Secretary Rumsfeld said the day prior to 9-11, "Business enterprises die if they fail to adapt, and the fact that they can fail and die is what provides the incentive to survive. But governments can't die, so we need to find other incentives for bureaucracy to adapt and improve."<sup>1</sup>

DoD has a serious dilemma that needs to be addressed. New missions continue to emerge; yet we must be prepared to accomplish the traditional missions as well. There are more tasks to perform (especially with the new war on terrorism) than there are resources. As reported in the *Early Bird* (prior to 9-11):

Since both civilians and the military agree that the current force structure is overworked even today, it is clear that the Bush administration inherited either too much strategy or too little military, and must rectify that problem. That is why any proposals to reduce the size of the military must be accompanied by a scaling back of the national security strategy if the administration hopes to win support for its plans in Congress, and among the military and civilian Pentagon planners.<sup>2</sup>



Scaling back the military may not be the right answer with all the emerging threats. The answer may be in a new way to look at the problem. Therefore, before explaining the proposed reorganization, let us first look at various perspectives and thought processes on reorganization.

## **Thinking About Thinking**

There's an interesting book by Rolf Smith, a retired Air Force officer, called *The 7 Levels of Change*. In it, he postulates that to be creative, a person must think about how they think, and to be truly innovative, that person must do something with those ideas. While this sounds simple enough, most people do not actually think about thinking. Smith outlines seven levels of thinking, each increasing in creativity and difficulty:<sup>3</sup>

- Level 1: Doing the Right Things
- Level 2: Doing Things Right
- Level 3: Doing the Right Things Better
- Level 4: Doing Away with Things
- Level 5: Doing Things Other People Are Doing
- Level 6: Doing Things No One Else Is Doing
- Level 7: Doing Things That Can't Be Done

Organizations looking for improvements too often fall into the trap of settling for one of the early levels of thinking. They look for ways to be more effective (level 2) and efficient (level 3). In many cases this can be very successful. However, if there are major factors that can impact the success of the organization in the future (like continued budget constraints, inability to modernize force structure, and lack of funds to address emerging threats), then it may be time to reach for a higher level of thinking.

The A-76 process seems to be an example that does not go past the first couple levels of thinking. There are many ways to save money. One of the three major recommendations of the 1995 Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces was to make support more

efficient and responsive, and urged “DoD to rely on the competitive private sector for support wherever market conditions permit.”<sup>4</sup> This affinity for competitive sourcing continues today. OMB Circular A-76, Performance of Commercial Activities, revised in 1999, identifies the policy of the US government to (a) achieve economy and enhance productivity; (b) retain governmental functions in-house; and (c) rely on the commercial sector.<sup>5</sup> The rationale is sound and when applied properly, can be positive.

However, it seems like we are outsourcing too much. The key flaw is that all the additional duties performed by military (and to some extent the volunteering of DoD civilians) is not captured in the most efficient organization (MEO). Therefore, the remaining active duty must continue to absorb those functions. For example, young airmen are dual and triple hatted, trying to learn their primary function, yet also being asked as security force augmentees, and maybe work a mobility line or cargo marshalling area during a deployment, as well as the unit Status of Resources and Training (SORTS) monitor. Due to their home base infrastructure, the Air Force seems to get the lion’s share of A-76. Since 1995, the Air Force represented over 50% of the completed competitive sourcing initiatives.<sup>6</sup> A-76 looks at making things more efficient, but does not take into account the second, third, and nth order effects.

The proposed reorganization tries to stretch the imagination. It strips traditional service boundaries. Rather than look at how to incrementally change DoD, the proposal identifies a radical departure, a “mindshift” using Rolf Smith’s terminology. It identifies a major departure to see what portions are within the “realm of reality.”

## **Corporate America**

If we are trying to develop the best military, it is helpful to look at how the civilian world develops the best organizations. In fact, the President often looks to successful businessmen to

head up the military.<sup>7</sup> There could be a separate research project on the various corporate organizational and leadership philosophies. This is not the purpose of this research. However, a quick review of corporate America can help stimulate ideas and identify potential benchmarks or new ways of thinking that could be applied to a DoD restructuring.<sup>8</sup>

Several examples in corporate America show how companies have redefined themselves to adapt to a new environment. It may be with matrix organizations, streamlining, or complete overhauls. One example comes from a man named Robert Lutz. Back in 1988 he transformed Chrysler Corporation. He broke down the company's "bloated, centralized engineering operation" and fighting the bureaucratic inertia and "outright resistance" created four "nimble and autonomous product development teams dedicated to small cars, large cars, minivans and jeep/truck operations."<sup>9</sup> Ten years later, he started working his magic again, this time with Exide Corp. He reorganized the company from a "collection of competing national sales companies into a single global structure."<sup>10</sup> And in 2001, Lutz is working with General Motors. Lutz said, "The difficulty of changing a culture increases with the square of its size. So if Ford were twice (Chrysler's) size, it would be four times harder to do it. If GM is three times (Chrysler's) size, it is going to be nine times harder to do it."<sup>11</sup> This is good advice, and provides an indication of how difficult it may be to change the current defense structure. While Lutz looked at a geometric increase in difficulty, with the size, complexity, and importance of the U.S. military, the difficulty of change is probably exponential, especially when factoring in legislative changes that would be required, and all the civilian contractors whose success (profit) is directly tied to the current structure.

Good management concepts are not unique to the United States. As just one example, if we head north, the same concepts are being discussed in Canada. Peter Lawton, a principal of

Coopers & Lybrand Consulting, explains how organizations can get caught up in “historic discontinuity.” He explains how companies start out with few rules. However, as the company ages and expands, the “organizational behaviors are formally codified in job descriptions, routines and policies. The organization ‘freezes’ around the right way of doing things.”<sup>12</sup> He states, “In a world of rapid change, the bureaucracy simply cannot change fast enough to keep pace with shifting strategies and suffers from the challenge of what we call historic discontinuity. The structure and stability that were the strength now become the liability.”<sup>13</sup> This sounds very much like the current bureaucracy in DoD. We continue to develop new doctrine, regulations, and processes to codify our best practices. Rather than consolidating processes, we often just add on. For example, the planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) process started in the 1960s under SECDEF Robert McNamara. Since then DoD has added the requirements generation system (RGS), joint requirements oversight council (JROC), joint warfighting capability assessment (JWCA), and more. We add on top of a Cold War structure, for fear of what would happen if we truly cleaned house. On top of that, Congress creates volumes of legislative requirements. While all of these documents provide good tools for training and standardization, they also become a serpentine roadblock against improvement. We can get through, but we make it difficult on ourselves.

Many people decide not to recommend change because they know how much bureaucracy they have to go through. However, there is hope. As Lawton explains, “we have seen significant swings in organizational thinking, from rigid hierarchies towards self-managed work teams and beyond to totally flexible virtual organizations. ... For their organizations to be continuously successful, executives need to explore organizational structures and approaches that will allow both stability and flexibility to occur simultaneously.”<sup>14</sup> He recommends exploring

flatter, flexible and fluid organizational approaches, such as a “soft-matrix” organization form. In the soft-matrix, the vertical hierarchical structure is retained, but temporary, project task teams are formed to work issues. This concept sounds similar to how the military establishing Joint Task Forces for contingency operations. If we can be flexible during wartime, then it may be possible to apply the same principles during peacetime.

Now there are skeptics of matrix management, and their concerns should be considered. In Christopher Bartlett’s article from *Harvard Business Review*, he warns that matrix structures have some shortfalls. He explains how matrix organizations sometime fail because it does not automatically change decision-making or attitude. Bartlett recommends focusing on “building healthy organizational psychology,” and that “the important goal is not to build the matrix structure in the company, but to build the matrix structure in the minds of managers.”<sup>15</sup> The proposed DoD reorganization is not a pure matrix structure. However, it does try to instill a matrix structure in the minds of military leaders.

Alan Brache, a member of the Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. management consulting firm, identifies two legitimate reasons to reorganize: (1) when “the current structure is impeding implementation of the organization’s strategy” and (2) “the current structure is disrupting the flow of key business processes.”<sup>16</sup> Brache identifies six steps to follow when deciding if reorganization is required—stating that strategy should drive the organization’s structure:<sup>17</sup>

- Step 1: Evaluate and, if necessary, refine the business strategy.
- Step 2: Identify the business processes that are most critical to the successful implementation of the strategy.
- Step 3: Define the characteristics of an organizational structure that supports the strategy and the core processes.
- Step 4: Define other objectives to be met by the organizational structure.
- Step 5: Generate alternative organizational designs.
- Step 6: Select the best organizational structure.

The proposed reorganization does keep our nation's strategy in the forefront (NSS, NMS, JV 20202, QDR). In addition, it addresses the service's core competencies, like the core processes identified in Brache's six steps.

Noel Tichy, author of *The Leadership Engine*, also has some good ideas that relate to this subject. "I have laid out my general theory of business. Fundamentally, it is that success requires the ability to master revolutionary change. It requires taking on the dramatic challenge of creatively destroying and remaking organizations in order to improve them, and doing so repeatedly. In order for organizations to win, revolution, driven by leaders with ideas and the heart and guts to bring them alive, must become a way of life."<sup>18</sup> Discussing DEC (a company that went from a \$26 billion market value in 1987 down to \$4.6 billion in 1992), he said, "After demand for their once-popular mini-computers began to lag, its 'matrix' management system of interlocking and overlapping committees was too slow to stop the company's downfall."<sup>19</sup>

On the bright side, Tichy discusses the success of Jack Welch of GE: "At GE, there were hundreds of thousands of workers and managers who had grown up in a business that was full of little fiefs, where control of knowledge was control of power, where nobody felt any stake in the success of other feifs, and where very few people ever got fired." Welch developed the term "boundarylessness" to describe the culture he envisioned. Welch wanted "the speed of a small company in the body of a big one." Our military today needs the speed and flexibility of a small unit in the body of the world's largest military. Tichy also explains how Welch believes that "the core of a boundaryless company ... are people who act without regard for status or functional loyalty and who look for ideas anywhere."<sup>20</sup> Our military today gets trapped in status (budget battles) and functional loyalty (service parochialism). The proposed reorganization tries to break the current mindset and create one where the boundaries between the services are insignificant.

## Corporate DoD

In addition to corporate America, there are several “pockets” within DoD that can provide insight into innovative concepts. Three of these include the Air Force Corporate Structure, the U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command.

***Air Force Corporate Structure.*** A strange place to look for a process to overcome the bureaucracy in the budget process is within the process itself. However, the Air Force Corporate Structure (AFCS) used to develop the Air Force program employs a matrix arrangement. This process seems to work well. The concept includes members of each functional organization providing representatives to the various review levels of the AFCS to develop the best program for the Air Force. There are about 29 “two-digit” functions on the Air Staff and secretariat,<sup>21</sup> 14 different panels within the Air Force Corporate Structure, and 11 different major force programs used to develop the Air Force budget. While there are similarities between the functions, panels and programs, there intentionally is not a direct correlation. In this way, it requires the collective effort of cross-functional experts to develop the best overall program. The various functions, panels and programs are shown in Figure 7.


Air Staff Functions		AFCS Panels	Major Force Programs
SB	SC	Air Superiority (AF/XPPC)	MFP 1: Strategic Forces
IA	SE	Global Attack (AF/XPPC)	MFP 2: General Purpose Forces
FM	SP	Global Mobility (AF/XPPM)	MFP 3: Intelligence and Comm
SN	HO	Space Superiority (AF/XPPS)	MFP 4: Airlift and Sealift
AQ	ST	Information Superiority (AF/XPPI)	MFP 5: Guard and Reserves Forces
GC	RE	RDT&E (SAF/AQXR)	MFP 6: Research and Development
MI	ANG	Logistics (AF/ILSY)	MFP 7: Central Supply and Maintenance
AA	SB	Battle Labs (AF/XORB)	MFP 8: Trng, Med, & Other Gen Pers Act
PA	JA	SAR (SAF/AQL)	MFP 9: Administration
LL	TE	NFIP (AF/XOIR)	MFP10: Support of Other Nations
AG	XP	Installation Support (AF/ILEP)	MFP11: Special Operations
IG	SG	CS&P (AF/XPMS)	
DP	HC	Communications/Information (AF/SCXR)	
XO	SV	Personnel/Training (AF/DPPR)	
IL			

**Figure 7: Air Force Functions, Panels, and Programs**

For example, one of the panels is Air Superiority. To develop the program within Air Superiority, it is not a pure rated (XO-Operations) task. The Air Superiority Panel includes representatives from operations, finance, acquisition, personnel, logistics, communications, plans and programs, plus the Guard and Reserves. This ensures the multiple interests of the various functional are considered.

***U.S. Marine Corps.*** The United States Marine Corps is an elite, mobile, expeditionary force that exudes pride. It is a mini-joint force in and of itself. The structure of the Marines evolves around a Marine Air Ground Task Force, or MAGTF. Within the MAGTF, whether a 40,000 person Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) or a 2000 man Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), it is comprised of four elements, as shown in Figure 8.





**Figure 8: Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Elements**

Source: United States Marine Corps Concepts and Issues 2000

The four elements include a command element (CE), ground combat element (GCE), Aviation Combat Element (ACE) and Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). This is like their own joint task force, but on a permanent basis. The air combat element, whether AV-8 Harriers, F/A-18 Hornets, or Cobra helicopters, are fully integrated to support the Marines on the ground. The ground combat element contains the bite-trees-and-eat-snakes-and-kick-the-door-down infantry, along with the necessary armor and firepower support. The CSSE provides all the service support, from combat engineering to food services. While each of these elements has a specific function, the Marines truly believe in their mottos of “every marine a rifleman” and “For the strength of the Pack is the Wolf, and the strength of the Wolf is the Pack.” It seems that all elements of the Marines work together and understand that while they each have a unique function and capabilities, it is the synergism of them together that brings success. The rest of the services sometimes believe that the strength lies in the individual service, and that inefficiency occurs when working together. Marines advocate the need for the MV-22 Osprey as the major air component acquisition program just as fervently as the need for the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) for the ground combat element. It is instilled in them from the start of

basic training at places like Paris Island that they work together. The same camaraderie should occur across all service lines.

***U.S. Special Operations Command.*** A third example within DoD worth discussing is U.S. Special Operations Command. Congress established USSOCOM in 1987, at the objection of the services, to correct serious deficiencies in the nation's ability to conduct special operations and low-intensity conflict. The nation had undergone a series of special operations failures, most notably the disaster of Operation Eagle Claw, the failed rescue attempt of 53 U.S. hostages from the American embassy in Iran in April 1980. Congress established USSOCOM as a unified command. However, USSOCOM also had service-like responsibilities to organize, train, and equip as well as a their own budget, major force program 11. The services were reluctant to agree to this concept, as it would mean they would have to give up a portion of their force structure and budget to USSOCOM. However, remaining under the services, special operations did not receive much emphasis.

It is fair to say that in the 15 years since USSOCOM was established, special operations has made significant progress. Today USSOCOM produces a product far better than any of the individual services could have imagined. The teamwork and professionalism of Special Forces has been clearly demonstrated during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. We should all take a hard look at this example. The services resisted such a radical change (a unified command with budget authority) for fear that it would impact their empire. However, because the constitution ensured civilian control of the military, Congress overrode the services' objections. We must be able to look past parochial interests for the good of the nation.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Rowan Scarborough, "Pentagon Staff to be Trimmed by 15 Percent," *Washington Times*, September 11, 2001.

<sup>2</sup> *Early Bird*, August 9, 2001.

<sup>3</sup> Rolf Smith, *The 7 Levels of Change*, (Arlington, TX.: The Summit Publishing Group, 1997), 3-6. Rolf Smith is a retired colonel from the US Air Force. He founded the first Air Force Innovation Center and now leads a company called The Office of Strategic Innovation.

<sup>4</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), *Press Release: Directions for Defense: The Report of the Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces*, Washington, D.C.: 25 May 1995. The report has three main recommendations: (1) improve unified military operations, (2) make support more efficient and responsive and (3) improve Defense management and direction.

<sup>5</sup> Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-76, *Performance of Commercial Activities*, 4 August 1983 (Revised 1999), 2.

<sup>6</sup> As of 27 Jul 2000, there were 399 initiatives completed since FY95, with Air Force 225, Navy 79, Army 58, and defense agencies 37.

<sup>7</sup> As mentioned earlier, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was CEO of three corporations before becoming SECDEF for the second time. In addition, Secretary of the Air Force James Roche was corporate vice president of Northrop Grumman. Secretary of the Navy Gordon England was executive vice president of General Dynamics. Finally, Secretary of the Army Thomas White was a senior executive at Enron (before its recent collapse).

<sup>8</sup> The QDR encourages benchmarking: "Private sector benchmarks should set the standard for government providers, whether the function is processing and paying a bill, moving a part from a supply center or depot to a field unit, or making the transformation from concept to employment."

<sup>9</sup> Mary Connelly, "Challenge is Déjà vu for Lutz," *Automotive News* (August 6, 2001), 48.

<sup>10</sup> Lindsay Chappell, "Lutz Put Exide in Recovery," *Automotive News* (August 6, 2001), 49.

<sup>11</sup> Connelly, 48.

<sup>12</sup> Peter Lawton, "Initiating and Managing Change in Your Organization," *CMA Magazine* 69, no. 7 (September 1995): 28-31.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> Christopher A. Bartlett, "Matrix Management: Not a Structure, a Frame of Mind," *Harvard Business Review*, v 68 (July-August 1990), 138-145.

<sup>16</sup> Alan Brache, Company Reorganization: Does the Medicine Treat the Cure?, *USA Today*, v 129, issue 2672 (May 2001), 28-30.

<sup>17</sup> Brache, 28-30.

<sup>18</sup> Noel M. Tichy, *The Leadership Engine: How Winning Companies Build Leaders at Every Level*, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.), 24.

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 38-39.

<sup>21</sup> A “two-digit” refers to the office symbol, for example, AQ is acquisition, XP is Plans and Programs, DP is Personnel.

## **Part Four**

### **A Proposal for a New Corps**

With an open mind and a fresh perspective, it is now time to turn to the proposed DoD reorganization. When discussing military transformation, there is often a tendency to emphasize new technology and weapon systems. However, the focus here is on the basic organization structure of the Department of Defense. The current system is an evolution of post World War II and Cold War thinking. For the past decade, our military has tried to evolve the cold-war structures to fight a modern war.<sup>1</sup> Instead of looking at small changes, it may be time for a major overhaul—trying to reach the “level seven” thinking discussed earlier. To propose a new structure, we need some guidelines or objectives. The key objectives of the proposed reorganization can be matched up to the seven levels of thinking:

- Level 1: Doing the Right Things: Maintain current capabilities and civilian control
- Level 2: Doing Things Right: Generate savings while maintaining balance of powers
- Level 3: Doing the Right Things Better: Improve jointness and interagency coordination
- Level 4: Doing Away with Things: Streamline the organization to reduce layers
- Level 5: Doing Things Other People Are Doing: Incorporate transformation concepts
- Level 6: Doing Things No One Else Is Doing: Provide flexibility to adapt to new threats
- Level 7: Doing Things That Can’t Be Done: New DoD structure

The proposed restructure has six basic steps:

- Step One: Streamline overhead. Eliminate the three service secretary staffs and transfer their functions up to OSD and realign down to the military departments.
- Step Two: Reduce layers. Transition and consolidate service-specific three-star level commands into standing joint task forces.


- Step Three: Change mindset. Establish a joint promotion system.
- Step Four: Reduce duplication. Consolidate the numerous defense and service support agencies performing similar functions into single agencies.
- Step Five: Increase flexibility. Transform the current military departments that contain both “tooth” and “tail” to smaller, more flexible “corps” focused on core competencies (tooth), and establish a joint support force (tail) to augment these warfighting corps.
- Step Six: Adapt concepts. Modify the combatant command concept to better meet the future spectrum of conflict.

## **Step One**

The first step is to streamline—not trim, but streamline--overhead by eliminating the three service secretary staffs and transfer their functions up to the office of the secretary of defense (maintaining civilian control s required) or realign down to the military departments. One of the major sources of redundancy, and a key impediment to increased jointness, is service parochialism. One of the reasons this is so hard to eliminate is because we have multiple layers of a stovepipe structure that encourage parochialism. The military departments and their service secretariats create an environment that rewards parochial accomplishments. If you are the Air Force Program Element Manager (PEM) for a weapon system, and you increase your funding line, you will likely receive a strong performance report, whether or not an increase in that system is really the best thing for the Department of Defense as a whole. If we eliminate the organization of the service secretaries, and consolidate their functions in either OSD and/or the military departments, we reduce one of the service layers and therefore one less service roadblock.

For example, after receiving inputs from the wings, NAFs, and MAJCOMs, AF/XP develops their service POM, and then routes it through SAF/FM before heading to OSD. The “inertia” that grows from each of these service-level looks--before getting a joint review--is hard to overcome. By the time it gets to OSD, it has been “validated” by numerous service-specific reviews.

During peacetime, the inertia moves through service rather than joint channels. The chain of command (for the Air Force) flows from the wing at base-level, through the numbered air force (NAF), major command (MAJCOM), Air Staff, Secretariat, and finally to the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). During wartime, the chain is streamlined. The Service secretary and chief of staff are not in the wartime chain of command. The unified commander replaces the MAJCOM, and the Joint Task Force Commander replaces the numbered air force. The Joint Staff provides advice and interface between SECDEF and CINC (Figure 9).



**Figure 9: Air Force Chain of Command**

Now there are several possible ways to address the divestiture of the service secretaries:

- a. Absorb the functions to OSD as undersecretaries of air, land and sea. While this may provide some manpower savings, the approach is more of a shell game—simply realigning the same functions under another higher headquarters.
- b. Absorb the functions straight into the military departments. This too would reduce the overhead, and with OSD still above them, it retains civilian control of the military.
- c. Add to OSD, but restructure not along “environment” lines of air, land, and sea, but along functional lines, theater lines, capability lines, etc.

The solution is probably a combination of the above. We need to provide the right balance between the organize, train and equip responsibility of the service and the employment responsibility of the unified commands. We still want the military departments to focus on their responsibility to organize, train and equip. This gives them the ability to develop sound doctrine in their core competencies--this is a necessary function. So we need the OSD level (including its need for civilian control) to identify the “cross-functional” overlap.


## **Step Two**

In addition to eliminating the service secretaries, a second way to eliminate layers is through a restructure of three-star service-specific warfighting units (e.g., Air Force numbered air force, Navy numbered fleets, Army corps). These units are organized to address service-specific needs and (for the Air Force at least) have become more of a holding pattern for three-stars—more of a political than a military-necessity organization. The NAFs (and equivalents) are not fully trained or staffed to serve as a JTF headquarters (although significant improvements are occurring, especially with interaction with U.S. Joint Forces Command), yet when a crisis arises, we task them to be the JTF and augment it with personnel from other services. If we consolidate the



NAFs (and equivalents) and establish a single standing joint task force (reporting to the CINC), we accomplish three objectives. First, we streamline service lines and reduce a peacetime layer. Second, we provide a more capable JTF staff that is trained and organized for joint operations. Third, a standing JTF can provide a joint perspective to the force structure development process earlier in the decision cycle.

These first two steps of the proposed restructure take the streamlined wartime concept we already use and adapts it to peacetime as well, creating a more viable joint warfighter. Figure 10 shows how the peacetime and wartime chain of command would look like for the Air Force.



**Figure 10: Proposed Air Force Chain of Command (Steps One and Two)**

## Step Three

The third step in the proposed reorganization is a process change rather than organization structure change. However, this change should significantly improve the success of the follow-on steps. In step three, the promotion system should transition to a joint promotion system.

Regardless of service, promotion is based on potential to succeed as a higher level and increased responsibility. A single promotion system, with common forms, boards, and guidelines, will help break down service cultural bias. It is amazing how emotional and arrogant officers become when discussing their promotion system (we have all heard discussions like, “well, in *our* service, we put the emphasis on ...”). Promotions in all services are governed by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), yet each service has developed their own stovepipe methods to maintain distinctions between services rather than promote based on the synergy of DoD as a whole. Former CJCS, General David C. Jones, said, “I cannot stress this point too strongly: He who controls the dollars, promotions, and assignments controls the organization—and the services so control, especially with regard to personnel actions.”<sup>2</sup>

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 did improve the promotion system for joint officers. By law, officers in joint duty positions must be promoted at least at the same average as their service headquarters counterparts. This helps bring high-quality officers to the Joint Staff and unified commands. However, the promotion board is still service-centric, so the officer has competing allegiance, between what’s best for the joint organization and what’s best for his individual service. While Goldwater-Nichols made great progress, it did not go as far as it could.

To help increase the interaction between services and minimize the significance of service boundaries, the promotion system should be modified to be fully joint at the flag officer level.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, for a colonel (or Navy Captain) to make O-7, they would compete at a joint board,

with appropriate representation from each of the services.<sup>4</sup> In this way, one's performance would be judged by how they contribute to the DoD mission as a whole, not service specific requirements. If an officer were too parochial, they would peak at the O-6 level. This would be a significant incentive for many aspiring leaders. This comment should not be misinterpreted that senior leaders are self-serving "careerists." Rather, the current system rewards service loyalty, and restrains people from rocking the boat. Officers may be inhibited from speaking out against their service's position if they know it could end their career. The current system creates an unnecessary moral dilemma. However, if the promotion system is truly joint at the senior level, then our leaders should be able to more freely discuss what they believe is in the best interest of the nation.

## **Step Four**

When looking at any proposal for a DoD reorganization, it would not be complete without addressing all the "cats and dogs" that make up the defense establishment. Most functional areas have developed "below the line" organizations over time to work special projects, hide manpower from management headquarters ceilings, etc. As a result, there is duplication of effort. By consolidating the enormous number of defense and service support agencies (defense agencies, DoD field activities, field operating agencies, direct reporting units, support commands, etc.), significant improvements in jointness, interoperability, and efficiency can occur. Of critical importance is to transfer acquisition from service channels to an OSD level organization to truly focus on the needs of joint force commanders in addition to service-specific needs.

Two of the recurring issues that stir up service parochialism are (1) funding and (2) roles and missions. The funding issue centers more on acquisition and weapon systems than operations


and maintenance (O&M), infrastructure, and military construction (MILCON). The roles and missions will be addressed in step five of the proposed reorganization. The greatest potential for increased efficiency and breaking down of service boundaries is to establish a single DOD-level joint acquisition organization. In 1999, Admiral (ret) William Owens, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, talked of the services' *crystalline stovepipes*, saying "service parochialism is still the most important factor in force planning."<sup>5</sup> Addressing acquisition reform is a subject in itself that could take volumes to properly address. Therefore, for the purpose of this overview of a proposed DoD reorganization, we will only address the issue from a macro-level.

Right now services have greater control over force structure than the unified command. As Andrew Krepinevich, executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, stated in his analysis of the September 2001 QDR, "Given Rumsfeld's emphasis on homeland defense, intelligence, space and long-range strike capability ... it's hard to understand why the Pentagon would need three new fighter jet programs now on the drawing board -- the Air Force's F-22, the Navy Super Hornet and the multi-service Joint Strike Fighter."<sup>6</sup>

As directed in Title 10 of the US Code, and detailed in DOD Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, unified commands do not have budget authority.<sup>7</sup> The services have the responsibility to organize, train, and equip (including research and development). Within the military community, it is the services that have legal control over the allocation of resources (of course they do not have total control, as the services submit their budgets through the Secretary of Defense to Congress for appropriations and authorization to spend their proposed budgets). With this lack of budget authority for the unified commanders as

a given, a CINC can influence joint force development (acquisition) through three key steps (Figure 11).

- (1) First, the CINC must develop his vision of the future as it relates to his theater of operation (threats, missions, capabilities) and the force structure needed to support current and future requirements.
- (2) Second, the CINC must have the means and opportunity to introduce his vision and requirements into the formal process to those who have the authority to make changes in the force structure.
- (3) Third, the military services, who have the legal power and authority, must respond to the CINC's input and implement the changes requested.



**Figure 11: Three-Step Process for CINC Influence in Force Development**

There is no single DoD joint force development process. Instead, it is a combination of overlapping systems that in the end provide force structure, through the services, for the unified commanders. The unified commands are at a disadvantage from the start because they do not have budget authority. Therefore, to influence the process, they must be successful in the three-step process of determining their needs, submitting their needs, and having the services implement their needs. There are numerous opportunities for the CINCs to identify their vision and provide input to various players, including the services, joint staff, and even Congress. In addition, many recent changes have increased the CINC's opportunity to provide input. The CINCs can adequately do steps one and two, and the mechanisms are available for step three to be successful. When they fail, it is not because the system does not allow it. Rather, it is because the services choose not to implement—and that is because they have the power of the acquisition bureaucracy under their control.<sup>8</sup>

While there is an undersecretary of defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Requirements Generation System has a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), the majority of the military's acquisition occurs within service channels. Each service has an assistant secretary for acquisition with a large staff supporting the structure. In addition, each military department headquarters has a sizeable programming staff that focuses on acquisition. These two functions are only the tip of the iceberg. Below the headquarters, each service has their main acquisition workforce. The Air Force has an Air Force Program Element Office (AFPEO) and the Air Force Materiel Command with over 90,000 people and 15 subordinate units.<sup>9</sup> The Army has Army Materiel Command with eight major subordinate commands and nine separate reporting activities.<sup>10</sup> The Navy has five systems commands (Sea, Air, Supply, Special Warfare, and Strategic). Navy Sea Systems Command alone has 50,000 people managing 130 acquisition

programs, with nearly one-fifth of the Navy's budget (approximately \$20 billion).<sup>11</sup>

If the acquisition infrastructure is consolidated into a DoD level organization, reporting to the Joint Staff or OSD, along with a Requirements Generation System that corresponds to the new structure, then significant savings can occur for DoD and the focus will be more on joint requirements than service stovepipes. This is much easier said than done, as the inertia of congressional and contractor interests have centuries of support behind them.

In addition to the acquisition functions, there are a host of other service support organizations that could be combined to reduce duplication and increase the joint perspective. One example is the legal function. OSD has a General Council. Each military service has a General Counsel, and each military department has a Judge Advocate General Office (the Navy actually has both the General Counsel and Judge Advocate General functions under the Secretary of the Navy), along with subordinate agencies (this is in addition to the legal staffs in each unit at all levels). The fifteen primary legal organizations are shown in Figure 12.

	<b>OSD</b>	<b>Air Force</b>	<b>Army</b>	<b>Navy</b>	<b>Marine Corps</b>
<b>Department of Defense</b>	General Council				
<b>Military Secretaries</b>		General Counsel	General Counsel	General Counsel Judge Advocate General	
<b>Military Departments</b>		Judge Advocate General	Judge Advocate General		Staff Judge Advocate
<b>Support Agencies</b>	Defense Legal Service Agency	Air Force Legal Service Agency Air Force JAG School	U.S. Army Legal Services Agency U.S. Army JAG School	Naval Legal Service Command Navy Justice School	

**Figure 12: Current DoD Legal Organizations**

While there may be some current service-specific legal issues (primarily dealing with rules of engagement), many legal issues cross service lines (UCMJ, environmental, personnel promotion/eligibility/administrative/ issues, HHG claims). A proposed restructure would have a general counsel at the OSD level, a single Defense Legal Services Agency, and a Judge Advocate General in a Joint Support Force (the Joint Support Force is described in step 5). This reduces the number of organizations from fifteen to four (Figure 13). There is top-level support for this type of consolidation. In September 2001, SECDEF Rumsfeld has remarked that "We have so many general counsel officers that we actually have another general counsel's office whose only job is to coordinate all those general counsels."<sup>12</sup> Similar realignments should be made for other functional communities.

<b>Organization Level</b>	<b>Current</b>	<b>Proposed</b>
OSD	General Counsel	General Counsel
Defense Support Agencies	Defense Legal Service Agency	Defense Legal Service Agency Defense JAG School
Joint Support Force*		Judge Advocate General
SEC USAF	General Counsel	
HQ USAF	Judge Advocate General	
Air Force	Air Force Legal Service Agency Air Force JAG School	
SEC ARMY	General Counsel	
HQ USA	Judge Advocate General	
Army	U.S. Army Legal Services Agency U.S. Army JAG School	
SEC NAVY	General Counsel Judge Advocate General	
Navy	Naval Legal Service Command Navy Justice School	
CMC	Staff Judge Advocate	

**Figure 13: Proposed Consolidation of DoD Legal Functions**

\* The Joint Support Force is detailed in Step Five



## Step Five

Step five in the proposed restructure looks to create a more joint and agile military structure. Each of the four military departments are composed of “tooth” and “tail.” The tooth is the direct warfighting capability, while the tail is the support. For example, an operational flying squadron would be considered tooth, while the public affairs office would be tail. In theory, the tooth of each service should have little duplication. If we have properly identified each department’s roles and missions, the core combat capabilities—the tooth—should be distinctive for each service. The tail—the support and infrastructure needed to support the combat capability—understandably would have duplication between military departments. Each service needs housing, transportation, finance, personnel, etc. Ideally, we try to maximize the tooth and minimize the tail. The tooth vs tail issue has been around for quite some time, and is still relevant today.<sup>13</sup>

Over time, the services have grown and developed long traditions. The organization as a whole has become so complex, that change is difficult. We find it hard to adapt to new threats. Part of this is due to internal bureaucracy, while part is due to external factors such as congressional and contractor influence. By creating smaller “rice bowls” that still provide the required capabilities, we can reduce the stagnation and provide a more flexible and agile force.


For example, Air Force F-15s, Navy F-14s, and Marine Corps F-18s all conduct strike missions in support of Operation Southern Watch and Operation Enduring Freedom. In terms of fighter aircraft, each of the military departments have similar capabilities, rather than unique core competencies (acknowledging that the Air Force does not fly off carriers). Rather than have both the Air Force and Navy have fighters, an “Air Corps” can have responsibility for all aircraft, a Naval Corps all surface ships, etc. Just as the Marine Corps trains and operates to fly off either

carrier or hard-deck, and chops to the Navy when they are on the carrier, so too can portions of the Air Corps train and operate in coordination with the Naval Corps.

The proposed restructure separates the tooth from the tail in today's current military departments. The tooth portion of each becomes a smaller "corps" of "core" capability. The remainder of the force (including civilians) would be consolidated into a Joint Support Force (with subordinate functional organizations for personnel, transportation, medical, etc.). The concept is similar to how the Combat Service Support Element of a Marine Corps MAGTF augments the command, air, and ground elements.

JV 2020 identifies five environments for 2020: air, land, sea, space, and information. The smaller "corps" would follow these lines, with one exception. The proposed reorganization would have an Air Corps, Naval Corps, Army Corps, Space Corps, and continue with the current Marine Corps. Until the new corps concept is fully operational and validated over time, our nation needs to maintain a ready force able to respond quickly to our nations calling. The Marines currently perform that mission, and for the near future, should continue. The fifth environment in JV 2020 of information would be part of the joint support force.

A change such as this understandably has significant impacts and many hurdles to overcome. It would need to be phased in over time, and there would be much debate over what functions or capabilities should be in the corps and which functions and capabilities should be in the joint support force. Figure 14 shows the concept of corps with a joint support force.



**Figure 14: Proposed DoD Restructure (Step Five)**

The smaller corps would be able to focus on their core competencies, yet not be large enough that self-fulfilling inertia overrides joint requirements. The joint support force would eliminate (“eliminate” may be too idealistic—it would significantly reduce) the duplication between support functions. There are several other advantages to the joint support force. First, it provides a significant increase in flexibility for the joint force commander. For example, during Operation Allied Force, the focus was on airpower (Air Force, Navy, and Marine air). The USAF support structure was stressed, while the Army did not have a significant role. During initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom, Special Operations played a huge role. With a truly joint support force, the SECDEF and JCS could realign the support force to maximize

effectiveness while spreading the hurt across DoD, not limited to a specific service. As the U.S. continues to remain engaged throughout the world, the need for flexibility becomes increasingly important.

Another benefit is increased interoperability. If we have a truly joint support force, the communicators, the C2 elements, the intelligence functions will migrate to single systems that support the service corps. Rather than the Air Force developing one system and the Navy another, the joint support force will be able to focus on support systems that support both air corps and navy corps. Rather than the individual services coming up with over 60 variations of UAVs, the corps or Joint Support Force could identify fewer, common platforms to accomplish the required tasks.

One of the biggest hurdles to overcome would be service parochialism. Current organization has made significant progress toward a more joint military. Goldwater-Nichols Act provided more authority and responsibility to the unified commands. It created a joint specialty officer (JSO) concept. Unfortunately, there is a history of service parochialism that seems to transcend jointness. General Zinni, in his “Commander’s Reflections” comments before retiring, echoed this perception that there is a service-centric inertia that is hard to overcome:

We teach our ensigns and second lieutenants to recognize that sister service as the enemy. It wants our money; it wants our force structure; it wants our recruits. So we rope ourselves into a system where we fight each other for money, programs, and weapon systems. We try to out-doctrine each other, by putting pedantic little anal apertures to work in doctrine centers, trying to find ways to ace out the other services and become the dominant service in some way. These people come to me and the other CINCs and ask, “What ‘s more important to you—air power or ground power?”

Incredible! Just think about it. My Uncle Guido is a plumber. If I went to him and asked, “What’s more important to you—a wrench or a screwdriver?” he’s think I’d lost my marbles.<sup>14</sup>

## Step Six

The final step in the proposed reorganization looks at the unified command structure. The current system of unified commands were the result of Cold War thinking. However, today's modern warfare has a new complexity. The lines between the various instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and information) are blurred. There is still a need to maintain civilian control of the military, a key foundation of American success from our constitution. However, the requirement for the military to interact with interagency, coalition and non-state (NGOs, PVOs, etc.) partners is increasing. It may be time to modify the unified command structure to better meet the future spectrum of conflict.

We have already seen this beginning to occur. Joint Forces Command has had several mission changes since the 1998 Unified Command Plan (UCP) started transforming it from a theater command (U.S. Atlantic Command) to its current hybrid situation of a functional CINC with regional responsibilities as well. Today, JFCOM's mission includes leading the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces, including joint experimentation, and providing CONUS-based forces and capabilities to theater commanders.<sup>15</sup>

After the terrorist attack on the United States, there was criticism of the inability of various intelligence and law enforcement agencies to share information and capabilities. As a result, President Bush established an Office of Homeland Security to help coordinate actions throughout the federal government. On the military side, a U.S. North American Command (USNORTHCOM), with the mission of homeland security, will stand up in October 2002. The terms of reference for establishing USNORTHCOM include:<sup>16</sup>

- Recommend mechanisms for coordination and interactions between USNORTHCOM and authorities of local, state, and non-DoD federal agencies.
- Plan for USNORTHCOM to be the US counterpart to, and potentially dual-hatted with, a binational US-Canadian command structure.
- Recommend appropriate interaction with the National Office of Homeland Security.

The terms of reference task the military to look at establishing interaction with non-military organizations. However, it is time to think past typical coordination between military units and civilian organizations and start looking at a merge of functions and structure to maximize capability and minimize the decision time cycle (i.e., reduce John Boyd's Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop).

We are still relying on a Cold-War Structure in a post-Cold War era.<sup>17</sup> In 1996, Senator Sam Nunn, former chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, wrote an article for *Joint Forces Quarterly* with similar thoughts: "Some assessments reveal weaknesses on the administrative side of DoD which have been magnified by post-Cold War security challenges. Excessive bureaucracy, slow response to new missions, ambiguous responsibilities among major defense components, and management by policy makers need to be examined."<sup>18</sup> However, there is a shift beginning with developments like JFCOM and USNORTHCOM that show that the lines between military, diplomatic, economic, and information instruments of national power are blurring. The current war on terrorism has stretched our concept of theater commanders. It is true that CENTCOM is the supported CINC for efforts in Afghanistan, but it is unclear who the CINC is (if there is one) for the global war on terrorism.

If we establish standing JTFs (step two) at the three-star level, then our four-star commands may be able to migrate toward interagency and coalition organizations. The nation's defense establishment should look at a restructuring that goes beyond the Department of Defense. There

are numerous organizations outside DoD that have emerged since the end of World War II and the 1947 National Security Act that play a part in national security (including the Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office, etc.). We should begin to look at developing regional interagencies. For example, today DoD has a theater commander. However, the State Department has Ambassadors for individual countries. The Ambassadors have a very narrow focus--they look at their country in somewhat in isolation of the surrounding region--and it can be difficult to coordinate actions between the various ambassadors and regional CINCs. In addition, our regional boundaries need to be relooked at (again). For example, in East Africa, the three countries of Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda are part of an East Africa Community (EAC) organization. However, Tanzania is assigned to USEUCOM, while Kenya is assigned to USCENTCOM. Our regional structure, both Defense Department and State Department, are not in line with the realities of the regions they oversee.

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century (Hart-Rudman Report), addresses the need to overhaul the national security system. The report concludes that, “After our examination of the new strategic environment of the next quarter century (Phase I) and of a strategy to address it (Phase II), this Commission concludes that significant changes must be made in the structures and processes of the U.S. national security apparatus. Our institutional base is in decline and must be rebuilt. Otherwise, the United States risks losing its global influence and critical leadership role.”<sup>19</sup> The report outlines changes in five key areas:

- *ensuring* the security of the American homeland;
- *recapitalizing* America’s strengths in science and education;
- *redesigning* key institutions of the Executive Branch;
- *overhauling* the U.S. government’s military and civilian personnel systems; and
- *reorganizing* Congress’s role in national security affairs

For step six of the reorganization, the Hart-Rudman recommendations to redesign and reorganize need serious consideration. At this macro-level of analysis, there are still many open issues on how a consolidated military and interagency organization would look and function. However, the basic concept of regional organizations comprised of both interagency and military functions should be pursued. We must improve the flexibility and speed of our national command and control, not just the military C2 function, to address the global threats in a new era of modern warfare--one where the enemy may be a nation with WMD or teenagers with small arms, where the targets may be soldiers with MANPADs or a cartel's bank account, and where winning the will of the enemy populace may reap greater rewards than defeating the enemy in combat.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> This concept of waging modern war in a cold war structure was the focus of the author's critical book analysis of General Wesley Clark's book, *Waging Modern War*. Source: Lt Col Kenneth Keskel, *National Security and Decision-Making: Critical Case Analysis Waging Modern War in a Cold War Structure*, December 20, 2001.

<sup>2</sup> David C. Jones, "Past Organizational Problems," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 1996), 28. While this quote is from an article General Jones wrote back in November, 1982, the thought is still true today.

<sup>3</sup> At the field grade and company grade level, the boards members could still be filled from the same service, although using the same standard procedures, forms, etc. Young officers should be focussed on developing their core competencies, so a review of their potential for increased responsibility at the lower levels can be adequately judged by peers in the same service. There could be discussion if the joint promotion board should occur earlier (i.e., O-6 promotions). There is flexibility on where the cut off should occur; however, general/flag officer promotions should definitely be joint, and company grade promotions could remain single service.

<sup>4</sup> The same could apply for E-8s and E-9s on the enlisted side.

<sup>5</sup> Admiral William Owens, quoted by David T. Fautua, "The Paradox of Joint Culture," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Autumn 2000), 83.

<sup>6</sup> Vernon Loeb, "Pentagon Says Homeland Defense is Top Priority," *Washington Post*, October 2, 2001.

<sup>7</sup> Each CINC has a budget. However, this is operational and maintenance, and other administrative, exercise, and training functions. Their budget does not include acquisition of weapon systems or force structure. They do not have a POM, except for Special Operations Command.

<sup>8</sup> An analysis of a unified command perspective of the force development process is available in the AWC research report by Lt Col Kenneth Keskel, *A Unified Command Perspective of a Non-Unified Force Development Process*, November, 2001. This report was one of the requirements for an elective course on Future Force Development, taught by Dr Wade Hinkle of IDA and Dr Michael Hickock, AWC faculty.



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<sup>9</sup> "2001 USAF Almanac," *Air Force Magazine* (May 2001), 1.

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Army Materiel Command website.

<sup>11</sup> *Navy Organization*, on-line, August 20, 2001, Internet, available from <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/organization>.

<sup>12</sup> Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, as quoted in Rowan Scarborough, "Pentagon Staff to be Trimmed by 15 Percent," *Washington Times*, September 11, 2001.

<sup>13</sup> The author prepared an officer-enlisted ratio analysis as one of his first assignments as a second lieutenant working for the Air Force Management Engineering Agency, Randolph AFB, Texas. Debates over tooth vs tail was as important then as it is today. When SECDEF Rumsfeld announced his plans to streamline the military (prior to 9-11), he also discussed the tooth vs tail issue, asking the services to reduce headquarters by 15 percent so more troops will be available at the "teeth" and fewer at the support "tail" of the force. As reported by Rowan Scarborough of the *Washington Times*, "The defense secretary's rhetoric could translate into deep cuts in the department's nearly 700,000 civilian jobs. It would also result in a shift of thousands of military personnel from the "tail" to combat jobs known as the "teeth."

<sup>14</sup> Anthony Zinni, "A Commander's Reflections," 34-36.

<sup>15</sup> United States Joint Forces Command homepage, on-line, Internet, March 29, 2002, available from <http://www.jfcom.mil/newcomer/newcomer1.html>.

<sup>16</sup> CJCS Memorandum, "Terms of Reference (TOR) for Establishing US Northern Command," March 7, 2002.

<sup>17</sup> This issue was the focus of the author's critical book analysis of General Wesley Clark's book, *Waging Modern War*. Source: Lt Col Kenneth Keskel, *National Security and Decision-Making: Critical Case Analysis Waging Modern War in a Cold War Structure*, December 20, 2001.

<sup>18</sup> Sam Nunn, "Future Trends in Defense Organization," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 1996), 63.

<sup>19</sup> The United States Commission on National Security/21 st Century, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21 st Century*, February 15, 2001, viii.

## Part Five

### Conclusion

*I behold the surest pledges, that as on one side, no local prejudices, or attachments; no separate views, nor party animosities, will misdirect the comprehensive and equal eye which ought to watch over this great assemblage.*

-- President George Washington's Inaugural Address

Our nation's military is the strongest it has ever been. In a symmetric confrontation, no nation can come close. However, we have seen how the parochialism, bureaucracy, and duplication of effort holds us back from our true potential. The post-Cold War era is a place of asymmetric threats. By maintaining the current culture of service stovepipes, our nation's resources are working in competition rather than in unison. In the most recent *Joint Force Quarterly*, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says we need to develop "intellectual interoperability."<sup>1</sup> This interoperability must go far beyond weapon systems and computers. It must be in the minds of our military leaders and the entire defense establishment--military organizations, the interagency, and Congress.

The six steps to a new security structure look at a very macro-view of the process. Obviously, to implement such changes, additional research is required. The intent of this paper was not to identify a final implementation plan. Rather, the goal was to stimulate discussion about the feasibility of each step in the proposed reorganization. There are many questions that must be

answered before implementing any of these changes. The scope of this reorganization is tremendous, impacting every facet of the department of defense, as well as the civilian support structure. There are numerous avenues for discussing the merits (as well as flaws) of the proposal. There are significant political, economic, and military implications.

The proposal in part four incorporates many of the ideas discussed in the earlier sections. It attempts to reach Rolf Smith's Level Seven thinking—doing things that can't be done. It recommends a more global, interagency structure like Robert Lutz used at Chrysler and Ford. It tries to instill a matrix mindset in the military leadership without the trappings of a matrix organization. It attempts to decrease the significance of service boundaries recommended by Jack Welch of GE by establishing smaller corps. It maintains a cross flow of personnel throughout the system like the Air Force Corporate Structure. It uses the Marine Corps' MAGTF building block concept and creates a synergy that our nation's Marines have exploited for over 200 years. It recognized that the change might be difficult for the services to handle, like establishing SOCOM, but looks at the problem from a national perspective, not service-centric view.

At the same time, it leaves open a host of questions that require further analysis. Some of these questions include:

- How do the roles and mission of the services change as a result of the reorganization?
- How do the functions of the military departments change?
- How does this have an impact on Competitive Sourcing and Privatization?
- How would the Air Force (and DoD) modify its Expeditionary Air Force concept to adapt to this new structure?
- What legislative changes are required to implement?
- Would congress support such a drastic change?
- How would this change impact the current balance of congressional power over the military?
- Does eliminating civilian service secretaries erode civilian control of the military?
- Does the constitution support the concept?
- Does the reorganization provide too much power to OSD and the CINCs at the expense of the services?

- Will the proposed reorganization provide the U.S. with a long-term structure to organize, train, and equip for the future?
- Is there a clear enough distinction between service (now corps) responsibilities and the theater commander's employment responsibilities?
- How will career progression work?
- What impact would this have on recruiting and retention?
- How would the military adequately train the joint support force to support all corps?
- Will this create a greater gap between line and non-line officers? Between "operators" and "support"?
- Do we lose any functionality by consolidating defense and service support agencies?
- Will OSD become too big to handle without the service secretaries?
- Does the new structure provide adequate command and control? Unity of command? Span of control?
- Who decides what core competencies go to the corps vs. the joint support force?
- Will the corps be able to maintain core competencies with a smaller force?
- How does the National Guard and Reserves fit in? How would mobilization occur? Would the Guard and Reserves need a similar restructure?
- Would the restructure provide new opportunities for base closure and realignment?
- How would the budget process (PPBS, JROC, JWCA, etc.) change?
- Does the structure improve interagency coordination?
- Does the structure allow the U.S. to respond to the spectrum of conflict?
- How does the Coast Guard fit in to the new structure?
- How does the new structure allow the U.S. to adapt to new, emerging threats?
- Does the structure allow for the appropriate research and development?
- How does this change accession training, initial skill training, and continuing PME?
- Does the new structure become too "joint," leading to consensus rather than a healthy debate?

The list could go on. To address each of these issues is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this report. Hopefully there is merit in the ideas expressed here. One of the underlying concerns was an effort to reduce the divisive nature of service parochialism. George Washington warned against parochialism in his inaugural address as the first President of the United States.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, our individual services have grown so large for so long that it is now difficult to see the view outside our individual service organizations.

It is good to have some debate between organizations. If we make the military "completely joint," we may lose some of our warfighting creativity. There must be a balance. The proposed structure tries to strike the right balance: maintaining small corps of core competencies while

eliminating redundant layers; consolidating the support functions into an efficient “tail” to make room for a more flexible, more powerful tooth.

One of the key strengths of the U.S. constitution is the system of checks and balances, or a balance of power. The constitution has provided both the moral foundation as well as avenues for flexibility that have transitioned a fledgling nation from 13 upstart colonies to the world’s sole superpower. It could take a major catastrophe to cause the necessary mindshift to transition our nation’s defense establishment. It took World War II to cause the United States to establish a separate Air Force and develop a coordinated Department of Defense. It took the failure at Desert One to provide the impetus for Congress to establish a Special Operations Command. The September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States caused the creation of an Office of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command. Hopefully we will not have to experience another catastrophe to see major improvements in our national security structure. The President and Secretary of Defense have already laid out the challenge to develop transformational changes for our military. The new corps concept presented here is a start. Let the debate begin.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Richard B. Myers, “A Word From the Chairman,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 2001-2002), 4.

<sup>2</sup> In his inaugural address, Washington said, “I behold the surest pledges, that as on one side, no local prejudices, or attachments; no separate views, nor party animosities, will misdirect the comprehensive and equal eye which ought to watch over this great assemblage.” Source: George Washington, *National Archives and Records Administration: Washington’s Inaugural Address* (April 30, 1789), on-line, Internet, January 4, 2002, available at <http://www.nara.gov/exhall/originals/inaugtxt.html>.

## **Appendix**

### **Comparison of Functions of the U.S. Military**

### Comparison of Functions of the Military Departments (DODD 5100.1)

Functions of the Department of the Air Force	Functions of the Department of the Army	Functions of the Department of the Navy
<p>6.6.3.1. The Air Force, within the Department of the Air Force, includes aviation forces, both combat and service, not otherwise assigned. The Air Force is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war, except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.</p>	<p>6.6.1.1. The Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and any organic aviation and water transport assigned. The Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war, except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.</p>	<p>6.6.2.1. The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in general, naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps, within the Department of Navy, includes not less than three combat divisions and three air wings and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Coast Guard, when operating as a Service within the Department of the Navy, includes naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein.</p> <p>6.6.2.1.1. The Navy and Marine Corps, under the Secretary of the Navy, are responsible for the preparation of Navy and Marine Corps forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war, except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with the integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy and Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.</p> <p>6.6.2.1.2. During peacetime, the Department of Transportation is responsible for maintaining the United States Coast Guard in a state of readiness so that it may function as a specialized Service in the Navy in time of war or when the President directs. The Coast Guard may also perform its military functions in times of limited war or defense contingency, in support of Naval Component Commanders, without transfer to the Department of the Navy.</p>

## Comparison of Functions of the Military Departments (DODD 5100.1)

Functions of the Department of the Air Force	Functions of the Department of the Army	Functions of the Department of the Navy	Marines
<p><b>Primary function</b></p> <p>6.6.3.2. The primary functions of the Air Force include:</p> <p>6.6.3.2.1. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the air--specifically, forces to defend the United States against air attack in accordance with doctrines established by the JCS, gain and maintain general air supremacy, defeat enemy air forces, conduct space operations, control vital air areas, and establish local air superiority except as otherwise assigned herein.</p> <p>Air and Missile Defense</p> <p>6.6.3.2.2. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, including the provision of forces as required for the strategic defense of the United States, in accordance with joint doctrines.</p> <p>Strategic</p> <p>6.6.3.2.3. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for strategic air and missile warfare.</p> <p>Amphibious</p> <p>6.6.3.2.4. To organize, equip, and provide forces for joint amphibious, space, and airborne operations, in coordination with the other Military Services, and to provide for their training in accordance with joint doctrines.</p> <p>6.6.3.2.9. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Air Force for amphibious operations and not provided for elsewhere.</p>	<p>6.6.1.2. The primary functions of the Army are:</p> <p>6.6.1.2.1. To organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land--specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas.</p> <p>6.6.1.2.2. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, including the provision of forces as required for the strategic defense of the United States, in accordance with joint doctrines.</p> <p>6.6.1.2.3. To organize, equip, and provide Army forces, in coordination with the other Military Services, for joint amphibious, airborne, and space operations and to provide for the training of such forces, in accordance with joint doctrines. Specifically, the Army shall:</p> <p>6.6.1.2.3.1. Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Army for amphibious operations and not provided for elsewhere.</p>	<p>6.6.2.2. The primary functions of the <u>Navy</u> and/or <u>Marine Corps</u> are:</p> <p>6.6.2.2.1. To organize, train, equip and provide Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and land-based naval air components--specifically, forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of communication, to establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations, to seize and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct such land, air, and space operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.6. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for strategic nuclear warfare to support strategic deterrence.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.4. To organize and equip, in coordination with the other Military Services, and to provide naval forces, including naval close air support and space forces, for the conduct of joint amphibious operations, and to be responsible for the amphibious training of all forces assigned to joint amphibious operations in accordance with joint doctrines.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.5. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, the doctrines, procedures, and</p>	<p>6.6.2.2. The primary functions of the Navy and/or <u>Marine Corps</u> are:</p> <p>6.6.2.2.2. To maintain the Marine Corps, which shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and perform such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct. However, these additional duties must not detract from, or interfere with, the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. These functions do not contemplate the creation of a second land army.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.3.1. Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, the doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations. The Marine Corps shall have primary responsibility for the development of those landing force doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.</p>



### Comparison of Functions of the Military Departments (DODD 5100.1)

Functions of the Department of the Air Force	Functions of the Department of the Army	Functions of the Department of the Navy	Marines
<p>6.6.5.1. With respect to amphibious operations, the Air Force shall develop, in coordination with the other Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Air Force and not provided for by the Navy and Marine Corps.</p> <p>Airborne</p> <p>6.6.3.2.10. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Air Force forces in airborne operations.</p> <p>6.6.5.2. With respect to airborne operations, the Air Force has specific responsibility to:</p> <p>6.6.5.2.1. Provide Air Force forces for the air movement of troops, supplies, and equipment in joint airborne operations, including parachuted and aircraft landings.</p> <p>6.6.5.2.2. Develop tactics and techniques employed by Air Force forces in the air movement of troops, supplies, and equipment.</p> <p>6.6.3.2.6. To organize, train, equip and provide forces for air transport for the Armed Forces, except as otherwise assigned.</p> <p>Space</p> <p>6.6.3.2.11. To provide launch and space support for the Department of Defense, except as otherwise assigned.</p> <p>6.6.3.2.12. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Air Force forces in the conduct of space operations.</p> <p>6.6.4. Air Force responsibilities in support of space operations include:</p> <p>6.6.4.1. Organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces to support space operations.</p> <p>6.6.4.2. Developing, in coordination with the other Military Services, tactics, techniques, and</p>	<p>6.6.1.2.3.2. Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Army and Marine Corps forces in airborne operations. The Army shall have primary responsibility for developing those airborne doctrines, procedures, and equipment that are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.</p> <p>6.6.1.2.3.3. Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Army forces in the conduct of space operations.</p> <p>6.6.1.4. Army responsibilities in support of space operations include the following:</p> <p>6.6.1.4.1. Organizing, training, equipping, and providing Army forces to support space operations.</p> <p>6.6.1.4.2. Developing, in coordination with the other Military Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by Army forces for use in space operations.</p> <p>6.6.1.4.3. Conducting individual and unit training of Army space operations forces.</p>	<p>equipment of naval forces for amphibious operations and the doctrines and procedures for joint amphibious operations.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.14. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Navy and Marine Corps forces in the conduct of space operations.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.15. To provide sea-based launch and space support for the Department of Defense when directed.</p> <p>6.6.2.4. Navy and Marine Corps responsibilities in support of space operations include:</p> <p>6.6.2.4.1. Organizing, training, equipping, and providing Navy and Marine Corps forces to support space operations.</p> <p>6.6.2.4.2. Developing, in coordination with the</p>	<p>6.6.2.2.3.2. Train and equip, as required, forces for airborne operations, in coordination with the other Military Services, and in accordance with joint doctrines.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.3.3. Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment of interest to the Marine Corps for airborne operations and not provided for by the Army, which has primary responsibility for the development of airborne doctrines, procedures, and techniques, which are of common interest to the Army and Marine Corps.</p>

## Comparison of Functions of the Military Departments (DODD 5100.1)

Functions of the Department of the Air Force	Functions of the Department of the Army	Functions of the Department of the Navy	Marines
<p>equipment employed by Air Force forces for use in space operations.</p> <p>6.6.4.3. Conducting individual and unit training of Air Force space operations forces.</p> <p>6.6.4.4. Participating with the other Services in joint space operations, training, and exercises as mutually agreed to by the Services concerned, or as directed by competent authority.</p> <p>Lines of Communication</p> <p>6.6.3.2.14. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces, as directed to operate air lines of communications.</p> <p>Special Operations</p> <p>6.6.3.2.15. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of special operations.</p> <p>Electronic Warfare</p> <p>6.6.3.2.17. To provide equipment, forces, procedures, and doctrine necessary for the effective prosecution of electronic warfare operations and, as directed, support of other forces.</p> <p>Psychological Operations</p> <p>6.6.3.2.16. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of psychological operations.</p> <p>Close Air Support</p> <p>6.6.5.3. With respect to close air support of ground forces, the Air Force has specific responsibility for developing, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines and procedures, except as provided for in Navy responsibilities for amphibious operations and in responsibilities for the Marine Corps.</p>	<p>6.6.1.4.4. Participating with other Services in joint space operations, training, and exercises as mutually agreed to by the Services concerned, or as directed by competent authority.</p> <p>6.6.1.4.5. Providing forces for space support operations for the Department of Defense when directed.</p> <p>6.6.1.2.9. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces, as directed, to operate land lines of communication.</p> <p>6.6.1.2.4. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of special operations.</p> <p>6.6.1.2.5. To provide equipment, forces, procedures, and doctrine necessary for the effective prosecution of electronic warfare operations and, as directed, support of other forces.</p> <p>6.6.1.2.6. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of psychological operations.</p> <p>6.6.1.5. With respect to close air support of ground forces, the Army has specific responsibility for the following:</p> <p>6.6.1.5.1. Providing, in accordance with inter-Service agreements, communications, personnel, and equipment employed by Army forces.</p> <p>6.6.1.5.2. Conducting individual and unit training of Army forces.</p> <p>6.6.1.5.3. Developing equipment, tactics, and techniques employed by Army forces.</p>	<p>other Military Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by Navy and Marine Corps forces for use in space operations.</p> <p>6.6.2.4.3. Conducting individual and unit training of Navy and Marine Corps space operations forces.</p> <p>6.6.2.4.4. Participating with the other Services in joint space operations, training, and exercises, as mutually agreed to by the Services concerned or as directed by competent authority.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.16. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces, as directed, to operate sea lines of communication.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.17. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of special operations.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.12. To provide equipment, forces, procedures, and doctrine necessary for the effective prosecution of electronic warfare operations and, as directed, support of other forces.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.18. To organize, train, equip, and provide Navy and Marine Corps forces for the support and conduct of psychological operations.</p>	

## Comparison of Functions of the Military Departments (DODD 5100.1)

Functions of the Department of the Air Force	Functions of the Department of the Army	Functions of the Department of the Navy	Marines
<p><b>Other Miscellaneous Functions</b></p> <p>6.6.3.2.5. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for close air support and air logistic support to the Army and other forces, as directed, including airlift, air support, resupply of airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical air reconnaissance, and air interdiction of enemy land forces and communications.</p> <p>6.6.3.2.7. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment for air defense from land areas, including the United States.</p> <p>6.6.3.2.8. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces to furnish aerial imagery for use by the Army and other agencies as directed, including aerial imagery for cartographic purposes.</p> <p>6.6.3.2.13. To organize, train, equip, and provide land-based tanker forces for the in-flight refueling support of strategic operations and deployments of aircraft of the Armed Forces and Air Force tactical operations, except as otherwise assigned.</p> <p>6.6.3.3. Collateral functions of the Air Force include the following:</p> <p>6.6.3.3.1. Surface sea surveillance and antisurface ship warfare through air operations.</p> <p>6.6.3.3.2. Antisubmarine warfare and antiair warfare operations to protect sea lines of communications.</p> <p>6.6.3.3.3. Aerial minelaying operations.</p> <p>6.6.3.3.4. Air-to-air refueling in support of naval campaigns.</p> <p>6.6.5. Other responsibilities of the Air Force include:</p>	<p>6.6.1.2.7. To provide forces for the occupation of territories abroad, including initial establishment of military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.</p> <p>6.6.1.2.8. To develop doctrines and procedures, in coordination with the other Military Services, for organizing, equipping, training, and employing forces operating on land, except that the development of doctrines and procedures for organizing, equipping, training, and employing Marine Corps units for amphibious operations shall be a function of the Marine Corps coordinating, as required, with the other Military Services.</p> <p>6.6.1.2.10.1. Functions relating to the management and operation of the Panama Canal, as assigned by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense.</p> <p>6.6.1.2.10.2. The authorized civil works program, including projects for improvement of navigation, flood control, beach erosion control, and other water resource developments in the United States, its territories, and its possessions.</p> <p>6.6.1.2.10.3. Certain other civil activities prescribed by law.</p> <p>6.6.1.3. A collateral function of the Army is to train forces to interdict enemy sea and air power and communications through operations on or from land.</p>	<p>6.6.2.2.8. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, protection of shipping, aerial refueling and minelaying, including the air and space aspects thereof, and controlled minefield operations.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.10. To provide air support essential for naval operations.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.11. To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, including the provision of forces as required for the strategic defense of the United States, in accordance with joint doctrines.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.13. To furnish aerial photography, as necessary, for Navy and Marine Corps operations.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.9. To provide the afloat forces for strategic sealift.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.7. To furnish adequate, timely, reliable intelligence for the Coast Guard.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.19. To coordinate with the Department of Transportation for the peacetime maintenance of the Coast Guard. During war, the Coast Guard will function as a Military Service. The specific wartime functions of the Coast Guard are as follows:</p> <p>6.6.2.2.19.1. To provide an integrated port security and coastal defense force, in coordination with the other Military Services, for the United States.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.19.2. To provide specialized Coast Guard units, including designated ships and aircraft, for overseas deployment required by naval component commanders.</p> <p>6.6.2.2.19.3. To organize and equip, in coordination</p>	

### Comparison of Functions of the Military Departments (DODD 5100.1)

Functions of the Department of the Air Force	Functions of the Department of the Army	Functions of the Department of the Navy	Marines
		<p>with the other Military Services, and provide forces for maritime search and rescue, icebreaking, and servicing of maritime aids to navigation.</p> <p>6.6.2.3. The collateral functions of the Navy and Marine Corps include the following:</p> <p>6.6.2.3.1. To interdict enemy land power, air power, and communications through operations at sea.</p> <p>6.6.2.3.2. To conduct close air and naval support for land operations.</p> <p>6.6.2.3.3. To furnish aerial imagery for cartographic purposes.</p> <p>6.6.2.3.4. To be prepared to participate in the overall air and space effort, as directed.</p> <p>6.6.2.3.5. To establish military government, as directed, pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.</p> <p>6.6.2.5. Other responsibilities of the Navy and Marine Corps include:</p> <p>6.6.2.5.1. Providing, when directed, logistic support of Coast Guard forces, including procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance.</p> <p>6.6.2.5.2. Providing air and land transport essential for naval operations and not otherwise provided for.</p> <p>6.6.2.5.3. Providing and operating sea transport for the Armed Forces other than that which is organic to the individual Services.</p> <p>6.6.2.5.4. Developing, in coordination with the other Services, doctrine and procedures for close air support for naval forces and for joint forces in amphibious operations.</p>	

### Comparison of Functions of the Military Departments (DODD 5100.1)

Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for, and have the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of their respective Departments, including the following:	Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the following activities of their respective Departments.	Common Functions of the Military Departments.	Common Service Functions
<p>6.2.1. Recruiting</p> <p>6.2.2. Organizing</p> <p>6.2.3. Supplying</p> <p>6.2.4. Equipping (including research and development)</p> <p>6.2.5. Training</p> <p>6.2.6. Servicing</p> <p>6.2.7. Mobilizing</p> <p>6.2.8. Demobilizing</p> <p>6.2.9. Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel)</p> <p>6.2.10. Maintaining</p> <p>6.2.11. The construction, outfitting, and repairs of military equipment</p> <p>6.2.12. The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities; the acquisition, management and disposal; and the management of real property of natural resources.</p>	<p>6.3.1. The functioning and efficiency of their Departments;</p> <p>6.3.2. The formulation of policies and programs that are fully consistent with national security objectives and policies established by the President and the Secretary of Defense;</p> <p>6.3.3. The effective and timely implementation of policy, program, and budget decisions and instructions of the President or Secretary of Defense relating to the functions of each Military Department;</p> <p>6.3.4. Carrying out the functions of the Military Departments so as to fulfill (to the maximum extent practicable) the current and future operational requirements of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands;</p> <p>6.3.5. Effective cooperation and coordination between the Military Departments and agencies of the Department of Defense to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and to eliminate duplication;</p> <p>6.3.6. The presentation and justification of the positions of their respective departments on the plans, programs, and policies of the Department of Defense;</p> <p>6.3.7. The effective supervision and control of Military Department intelligence activities; and</p> <p>6.3.8. Such other activities as may be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.</p>	<p>6.4.1. To prepare forces and establish reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war and plan for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war.</p> <p>6.4.2. To maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly organized, trained, and equipped for employment in emergency.</p> <p>6.4.3. To provide adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence and counter-intelligence for the Military Department and other agencies as directed by competent authority.</p> <p>6.4.4. To recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.</p> <p>6.4.5. To prepare and submit budgets for their respective departments; justify before the Congress budget requests as approved by the President; and administer the funds made available for maintaining, equipping, and training the forces of their respective departments, including those assigned to Unified and Specified Combatant Commands. The budget submissions to the Secretary of Defense by the Military Departments shall be prepared on the basis, among other things, of the recommendations of CINCs and of Service component commanders of forces assigned to Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.</p> <p>6.4.6. To conduct research; develop tactics, techniques, and organization; and develop and procure weapons, equipment, and supplies essential to the fulfillment of the functions assigned in this Directive.</p> <p>6.4.7. To develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations, including lines of communication, and to provide administrative and logistics support for all forces and bases, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.</p>	<p>6.5.1. Determining Service force requirements and making recommendations concerning force requirements to support national security objectives and strategy and to meet the operational requirements of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.</p> <p>6.5.2. Planning for the use of the intrinsic capabilities of resources of the other Services that may be made available.</p> <p>6.5.3. Recommending to the JCS the assignment and deployment of forces to Unified and Specified Combatant Commands established by the President through the Secretary of Defense.</p> <p>6.5.4. Administering Service forces.</p> <p>6.5.5. Providing logistic support for Service forces, including procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.</p> <p>6.5.6. Developing doctrines, procedures, tactics, and techniques employed by Service forces.</p> <p>6.5.7. Conducting operational testing and evaluation.</p> <p>6.5.8. Providing for training for joint operations and joint exercises in support of Unified and Specified Combatant Command operational requirements, including the following:</p> <p>6.5.8.1. Development of Service training, doctrines, procedures, tactics, techniques, and methods of organization in accordance with policies and procedures established in Service publications.</p> <p>6.5.8.2. Development and preparation of Service publications to support the conduct of joint training.</p> <p>6.5.8.3. Determination of Service requirements to enhance the effectiveness of joint training.</p> <p>6.5.8.4. Support of that joint training directed by the</p>

### Comparison of Functions of the Military Departments (DODD 5100.1)

Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for, and have the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of their respective Departments, including the following:	Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the following activities of their respective Departments.	Common Functions of the Military Departments.	Common Service Functions
		<p>6.4.8. To provide, as directed, such forces, military missions, and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national interests of the United States.</p> <p>6.4.9. To assist in training and equipping the military forces of foreign nations.</p> <p>6.4.10. To provide, as directed, administrative and logistic support to the headquarters of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, to include direct support of the development and acquisition of the command and control systems of such headquarters.</p> <p>6.4.11. To assist each other in the accomplishment of their respective functions, including the provisions of personnel, intelligence, training, facilities, equipment, supplies, and services.</p> <p>6.4.12. To prepare and submit, in coordination with other Military Departments, mobilization information to the JCS.</p>	<p>Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands and conduct of such additional joint training as is mutually agreed upon by the Services concerned.</p> <p>6.5.9. Operating organic land vehicles, aircraft, and ships or craft.</p> <p>6.5.10. Consulting and coordinating with the other Services on all matters of joint concern.</p> <p>6.5.11. Participating with the other Services in the development of the doctrines, procedures, tactics, techniques, training, publications, and equipment for such joint operations as are the primary responsibility of one of the Services.</p>

## Comparison of Functions of the Military Departments (DODD 5100.1)

<p>2.1. All functions in the Department of Defense and its component agencies are performed under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.</p> <p>2.2. The Department of Defense is composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments and the Military Services within those Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Joint Staff, the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities and commands as may be established or designated by law, or by the President or the Secretary of Defense. The functions of the heads of these offices shall be as assigned by the Secretary of Defense in accordance with existing law.</p> <p>2.2.1. In providing immediate staff assistance and advice to the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, though separately identified and organized, function in full coordination and cooperation in accordance with reference (b).</p> <p>2.2.1.1. The Office of the Secretary of Defense includes the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretaries of Defense, Comptroller of the Department of Defense, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, and such other offices and officials as may be established by law or by the Secretary of Defense.</p> <p>2.2.1.2. The Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the functions assigned to them. To the extent it does not impair his independence in the performance of his duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except the Chairman, shall inform the Secretary of his Military Department regarding military advice rendered by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters affecting his Military Department.</p> <p>2.2.1.3. The Inspector General, Department of Defense, provides staff assistance and advice to the Secretary of Defense in accordance with the responsibilities specified in Public Law 95-452 (reference (c)) and DoD Directive 5106.1 (reference (d)).</p> <p>2.2.2. Each Military Department (the Department of the Navy to include the United States Marine Corps, and the United States Coast Guard when transferred in accordance with sections 2, 3, and 145 of 14 U.S.C. (reference (e))) shall be separately organized under its own Secretary and shall function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. Orders to the Military Departments shall be issued through the Secretaries of these</p>	<p>5.1. Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and control of the Commander of a Unified or Specified Combatant Command with respect to the commands and forces assigned to that command include the command functions of:</p> <p>5.1.1. Giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics;</p> <p>5.1.2. Prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command;</p> <p>5.1.3. Organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;</p> <p>5.1.4. Employing forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;</p> <p>5.1.5. Assigning command functions to subordinate commanders;</p> <p>5.1.6. Coordinating and approving those aspects of administration, support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; and</p> <p>5.1.7. Exercising the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial, as provided in 10 U.S.C. (reference (f)).</p> <p>5.2. If a commander of a combatant command at any time considers his authority, direction, or control with respect to any of the commands or forces assigned to the command to be insufficient to command effectively, the commander shall promptly inform the Secretary of Defense.</p> <p>5.3. Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, Commanders of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands exercise authority over subordinate commanders as follows:</p> <p>5.3.1. Commanders of commands and forces assigned to a Unified or Specified Combatant Command are under the authority, direction, and control of, and are responsible to, the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command on all matters for which the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command has been assigned authority under subsection 5.1. above;</p>	<p>The Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the Chairman; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and supported by the Joint Staff, constitute the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense.</p> <p>4.1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman shall be responsible for the following principal functions:</p> <p>4.1.1. Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the preparation of annual policy guidance for the heads of Department of Defense components for the preparation and review of program recommendations and budget proposals.</p> <p>4.1.2. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the preparation of policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans.</p> <p>4.1.3. Assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces, including the direction of operations conducted by the Commanders of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.</p> <p>4.1.4. Prepare strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective.</p> <p>4.1.5. Prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans and recommend the assignment of logistics and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.</p> <p>4.1.6. Prepare military strategy and assessments of the associated risks. These will include the following:</p> <p>4.1.6.1. A military strategy to support national objectives within policy and resource-level guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. Such strategy shall include broad military options prepared by the Chairman with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.</p> <p>4.1.6.2. Net assessments to determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared to those of possible adversaries.</p> <p>4.1.7. Provide for the preparation and review of contingency plans that conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense.</p>
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## Comparison of Functions of the Military Departments (DODD 5100.1)

<p>Departments, or their designees, by the Secretary of Defense or under authority specifically delegated in writing by the Secretary of Defense or as provided by law.</p> <p>2.2.2.1. The Secretary of each Military Department, and the civilian employees and members of the Armed Forces under the jurisdiction of the Military Department Secretary, shall cooperate fully with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to achieve efficient administration of the Department of Defense and to carry out effectively the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.</p> <p>2.2.2.2. The Secretary of Defense shall keep the Secretaries of the Military Departments informed with respect to military operations and activities of the Department of Defense that directly affect their respective responsibilities.</p> <p>2.2.3. The Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the military missions assigned to them and shall exercise command authority over forces assigned to them as directed by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to section 10 U.S.C. 164 (reference (f)). The operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands. The Chairman, JCS, functions within the chain of command by transmitting to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands the orders of the President or the Secretary of Defense.</p> <p>2.2.3.1. Orders to such commanders shall be issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense or by the Chairman, JCS, with the authority and direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense.</p> <p>2.2.3.2. Communications from the President or the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands shall be transmitted through the Chairman, JCS. Communications from the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands to the President and/or the Secretary of Defense shall be transmitted through the Chairman, JCS.</p> <p>2.2.3.3. Communications in matters of joint interest, addressed to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands by other authority, shall, unless urgent circumstances do not permit, be coordinated with the Chairman, JCS. Information copies of all communications in matters of joint interest between Washington-level offices, agencies, activities and commands and the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands shall be provided to the Chairman, JCS.</p> <p>2.2.3.4. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman acts as the spokesman for</p>	<p>5.3.2. The commander of a command or force referred to in paragraph 5.3.1., above, shall communicate with other elements of the Department of Defense on any matter for which the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command has been assigned authority under subsection 5.1. in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command;</p> <p>5.3.3. Other elements of the Department of Defense shall communicate, with the commander of a command or force referred to in 5.3.1. on any matter for which the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command has been assigned authority under subsection 5.1., above, in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command; and</p> <p>5.3.4. If directed by the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command, the commander of a command or force referred to in paragraph 5.3.1. shall advise the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command of all communications to and from other elements of the Department of Defense on any matter for which the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command has not been assigned authority under subsection 5.1.</p>	<p>of Defense.</p> <p>4.1.8. Prepare joint logistics and mobility plans to support those contingency plans and recommend the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.</p> <p>4.1.9. Advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans, and assess the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans.</p> <p>4.1.10. After consultation with the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, establish and maintain a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each Unified and Specified Combatant Command to carry out missions assigned to the command.</p> <p>4.1.11. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of the requirements, especially operational requirements, identified by the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.</p> <p>4.1.12. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments and other components of the Department of Defense conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.</p> <p>4.1.13. If deemed necessary, submit to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense, to achieve greater conformance with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities for the requirements of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.</p> <p>4.1.14. In accordance with guidance of the Secretary of Defense, recommend budget proposals for activities of each Unified and Specified Combatant Command, as appropriate. Activities for which funding may be requested include:</p> <p>4.1.14.1. Joint Exercises</p> <p>4.1.14.2. Force Training</p> <p>4.1.14.3. Contingencies</p> <p>4.1.14.4. Selected Operations</p>
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## Comparison of Functions of the Military Departments (DODD 5100.1)

<p>Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, especially on the operational requirements of their commands and shall be responsible for overseeing the activities of the combatant commands. The President and the Secretary of Defense may assign other duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command functions.</p> <p>3. FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE</p> <p>As prescribed by higher authority, the Department of Defense shall maintain and employ Armed Forces to:</p> <p>3.1. Support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.</p> <p>3.2. Ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest.</p> <p>3.3. Uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.</p>		<p>4.1.15. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the major programs and policies of the Armed Forces in the area of manpower conform with strategic plans.</p> <p>4.1.16. Assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs.</p> <p>4.1.17. Develop and establish doctrine for all aspects of the joint employment of the Armed Forces.</p> <p>4.1.18. Formulate policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the Armed Forces.</p> <p>4.1.19. Provide for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.</p> <p>4.1.20. Submit to the Secretary of Defense, not less than once every 3 years, a report containing such recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (roles and missions) to the Armed Forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the Armed Forces.</p> <p>4.1.21. Prescribe the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman, JCS, subject to approval of the Secretary of Defense.</p> <p>4.1.22. Exercise exclusive direction of the Joint Staff.</p> <p>4.1.23. Subject to the direction of the President, attend and participate in meetings of the National Security Council.</p> <p>4.1.24. Advise and assist the President and the Secretary of Defense on establishing Unified and Specified Combatant Commands to perform military missions and on prescribing the force structure of those commands.</p> <p>4.1.25. Periodically, not less than every 2 years, review the missions, responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force structure of each Unified and Specified Combatant Command; and recommend to the President through the Secretary of Defense, any changes to missions, responsibilities, and force structure, as may be necessary.</p> <p>4.1.26. Transmit communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, as directed by the President.</p> <p>4.1.27. Perform duties, as assigned by the President or the Secretary of Defense, to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command function.</p>
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### Comparison of Functions of the Military Departments (DODD 5100.1)

		<p>4.1.28. Oversee the activities of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.</p> <p>4.1.29. Advise the Secretary of Defense on whether a Commander of a Unified or Specified Combatant Command has sufficient authority, direction, and control over the commands and forces assigned to the command to exercise effective command of those commands and forces.</p> <p>4.1.30. Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on measures to provide for the administration and support of forces assigned to each Unified and Specified Combatant Command.</p> <p>4.1.31. Advise the Secretary of Defense on whether aspects of the administration and support necessary for the accomplishment of missions should be assigned to the Commander of a Unified or Specified Combatant Command.</p> <p>4.1.32. Serve as the spokesman for Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, especially on the operational requirements of their commands.</p> <p>4.1.33. Provide overall supervision of those Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities for which the Chairman, JCS, has been designated by the Secretary of Defense to oversee. Perform such other functions with respect to the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities as may be assigned by the Secretary of Defense.</p> <p>4.1.34. Periodically, not less than every 2 years, report to the Secretary of Defense on the responsiveness and readiness of designated combat-support agencies.</p> <p>4.1.35. Provide for the participation of combat-support agencies in joint training exercises, assess their performance, and take steps to provide for changes to improve their performance.</p> <p>4.1.36. Develop, in consultation with the director of each combat-support agency, and maintain a uniform readiness reporting system for combat- support agencies.</p> <p>4.1.37. Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the periodic review and revision of the curriculum of each professional military education school to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters.</p> <p>4.1.38. Review the reports of selection boards that consider for promotion officers serving, or having served, in joint duty assignments in accordance with guidelines furnished by the Secretary of Defense and return the reports with determinations and comments</p>
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### Comparison of Functions of the Military Departments (DODD 5100.1)

		<p>to the Secretary of the appropriate Military Department.</p> <p>4.1.39. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the establishment of career guidelines for officers with the joint specialty.</p> <p>4.1.40. Submit to the Secretary of Defense an evaluation of the joint duty performance of officers recommended for an initial appointment to the grade of lieutenant general or vice admiral, or initial appointment as general or admiral.</p> <p>4.1.41. Promulgate Joint Chiefs of Staff publications (JCS Pubs) to provide military guidance for joint activities of the Armed Forces.</p> <p>4.1.42. Review the plans and programs of the Commanders of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands to determine their adequacy and feasibility for the performance of assigned missions.</p> <p>4.1.43. Provide military guidance for use by the Military Departments, the Military Services, and the Defense Agencies in the preparation of their respective detailed plans.</p> <p>4.1.44. Participate, as directed, in the preparation of combined plans for military action in conjunction with the Armed Forces of other nations.</p> <p>4.1.45. Determine the headquarters support, such as facilities, personnel, and communications, required by Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, and recommend the assignment to the Military Departments of the responsibilities for providing such support.</p> <p>4.1.46. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for information and consideration, general strategic guidance for the development of industrial and manpower mobilization programs.</p> <p>4.1.47. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense military guidance for use in the development of military aid programs and other actions relating to foreign military forces.</p> <p>4.1.48. Formulate policies for the joint training of the Armed Forces.</p> <p>4.1.49. Assess joint military requirements for command, control, and communications; recommend improvements; and provide guidance on aspects that relate to the conduct of joint operations.</p> <p>4.1.50. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for information and consideration in connection with the preparation of budgets, statements of military requirements based upon U.S. strategic war plans. These statements of requirements shall include tasks, priority of tasks, force requirements, and general strategic guidance</p>
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### Comparison of Functions of the Military Departments (DODD 5100.1)

		<p>for developing military installations and bases, and for equipping and maintaining military forces.</p> <p>4.1.51. In carrying out his functions, duties, and responsibilities, the Chairman, JCS, shall, as he considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.</p> <p>4.1.52. Perform such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.</p> <p>4.2. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as specified below:</p> <p>4.2.1. A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or in addition to, the advice or opinion presented by the Chairman. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present that advice or opinion to the President, Secretary of Defense, or National Security Council at the same time that he presents his own advice. The Chairman shall also, as he considers appropriate, inform the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to any matter.</p> <p>4.2.2. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers, shall provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense requests such advice.</p> <p>4.3. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the Office of the Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.</p>
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